Daily Report

East Europe

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Yugoslavia

Interrepublic—Serbia and Montenegro held consultations in Titograd to discuss the establishment of "principles for future relations" in the "new" Yugoslavia, TANJUG reports. An official communique was issued enumerating the principles of the "common state" which will be the "continuation of Yugoslavia." President of the Montenegrin Assembly Risto Vukcevic said the talks were "constructive and principled, and displayed a lot of cooperation." Serbian Assembly President Aleksandar Bakocevic stressed that "a major task" had successfully been completed.

TANJUG reports mutual recognition among Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia. All three republics recognized each others' independence and requested the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Croatia—President Franjo Tudjman categorically denied reports that Croatia is importing MiG-21 aircraft from Germany. Zagreb TV quotes Tudjman as saying, "it is not true that Germany is delivering, or that it expressed readiness to deliver, any kind of military aircraft to Croatia." Tudjman called the foreign press allegations "completely arbitrary and untrue." He also denied allegations that Croatia is preparing an offensive in the "temporarily occupied areas" of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb TV reports. He added that "Croatia has accepted and is awaiting the arrival of peacekeeping forces."

Czechoslovakia

Prague radio reports that "for health reasons" President Vaclav Havel will not testify as a witness at the trial of former Interior Ministry officials, according to the presidential office press department. The new date for Havel's testimony may be announced on 17 February at the regular presidential office press briefing.

The results of the "most keenly awaited" item on the Slovak National Council's agenda were reported on 12 February. According to Prague radio, the Slovak parliament failed to pass the draft national treaty adopted by a joint Czech-Slovak commission. "Of the 20-strong Presidium, 10 voted for and 10 against." Frantisek Miklosko, Slovak National Council Presidium chairman, described the session as "a suspension of the talks..." "Concluding a treaty is not possible at this time," according to Miklosko.

Romania

ROMPRES and Bucharest radio note that, despite some "irregularities" and "counting errors," results for the 9 February local elections continue to be reported. Runoff elections will be held in some areas, including Bucharest, where opposition candidate Crin Halaicu is presently in the lead.

Hungary

Budapest radio reports that Hungary held negotiations with Ukrainian officials on the "purchase of military equipment." Hungary will reportedly pay Ukraine with agricultural equipment for the "military materiel," according to the National Assembly Defense Committee head, State Secretary Jeno Laszlo.

Podkrepa Labor Conferation Congress Continues

Adopts New Confederation Program

AU1102205392 Sofia BTA in English 1953 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 11 (BTA)—Today was the fourth day of the Second Congress of the Podkrepa Labour Confederation. The delegates adopted a new programme of the confederation. Among its basic principles are: Independence from the government, the employers' organizations and the political parties; representation of the trade union interests at all levels before the social partners in this country and abroad; democratic structures and functioning based on freedom and pluralism in trade union association.

According to the analysis made at the congress, Podkrepa has to a great extent fulfilled its first programme, directed above all to the establishment of trade union pluralism in this country and defence of the right of everyone to trade union association. Podkrepa was set up in 1989 by seven intellectuals and was the first independent trade union in Bulgaria. Later it was one of the founders of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and left this coalition after it came to power. Now Podkrepa has structures throughout the country and numbers several hundred thousand members, according to the congress materials.

The new programme of the confederation is directed towards the defence of concrete trade union interests. It also sets forth the new functions of Podkrepa in the transition to a market economy—"a transition from the destructive approach to the centralized economic structures towards a positive constructive formation of the new market agents." According to the congress, Podkrepa should become a catalyst and a corrective of the economic reform because the interests of its members are related to the success of the reform.

The programme also dwells in detail on Podkrepa's views on partnership with the government and the employers which differ considerably from the ones of the government. The confederation will insist on the establishment of a tripartite system of partnership at three levels: national, branch and regional, and on the obligatory nature of the adopted decisions for the state institutions, something to which the government objects.

Today the congress heard the address of President Zhelyu Zhelev, after it was initially announced in the hall that Dr. Zhelev would visit the session himself. I am convinced that in the present moment and in the future this trade union amalgamation will be a staunch defender of its members and that in its work it would take into account the interests of the democratic process in this country, the safeguarding of civil and social peace and the realization of the economic reform in the name of Bulgaria's future, it was pointed out in the address of the head of state. He wished the members of Podkrepa, its newly elected leadership and Dr. Trenchev himself "greater wisdom, will and patriotism" in their work. After hearing the addresses of Mr. Stefan Savov, chairman of the National Assembly and leader of the Democratic Party (in the SDS), of Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov, floor leader of the parliamentary faction of the SDS, and of Nikolay Vasilev, deputy prime minister and leader of the Alternative Social Liberal Party (in the SDS) on its first working day, today the congress was congratulated by President Zhelyu Zhelev, too.

Elects Control Commission Leaders

AU1102191092 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] The 2d Podkrepa Labor Confederation Congress adopted a new program and elected an Executive Council composed of 11 members. Kamen Zlatkov and (Evtim Boyadzhiev) were elected respectively chairman and deputy chairman of the Central Control Auditing Commission at the second voting.

Podkrepa's Trenchev Criticizes Government on Reform

AU1202113392 Sofia VEK 21 in Bulgarian No. 5, 4 Feb 92 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, by Lyuben Lachanski; place and date not given: "The Economic Reform Is Virtually Nonexistent"]

[Text] [Lachanski] Dr. Trenchev, what is the approach of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation to the occupation of the "Bistritsa" Residence [by Podkrepa Labor Confederation members] and to the further development of the conflict?

[Trenchev] All is quiet at the "Bistritsa" Residence. A group of our people is in charge of closely guarding the building. Everything has been sealed off, and even filmed by a video camera, which is for the purposes of the investigation. Naturally, we have our own video copy. Nevertheless, we are absolutely convinced that this building should serve the needs of the public, rather than other, rather dubious purposes, as was the case in the past when it almost became a brothel and was certainly used for laundering dirty money. We have plenty of evidence for this. It is also high time that the Podkrepa members were trained as real trade unionists in that building. Our friends from the West will provide adequate opportunities for such training, which is not going to cost the Bulgarian Government any money and any obligations. If someone does not wish this to happen, he should come forward and say so, and he should identify himself.

[Lachanski] Has there been a delay in the economic reform? What measures is Podkrepa planning for the near future?

[Trenchev] The economic reform is virtually nonexistent. There have been some steps in a positive direction, but being isolated from each other, they did not

produce any positive results. All trends in the present-day policy (I am talking about the policy over a long period of time, of course) are negative. The political program of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] explained how to implement the reform and the voters who elected the "blue" ideas of the SDS (and who were members of our organization in their majority), voted in support of the reform. Nevertheless, at this time we do not know what trend the Bulgarian economy is supposed to follow.

Podkrepa has its own method to solve problems, divided into the following three stages: In the first place, we present the problem, we produce facts and arguments, we produce evidence, we analyze the causes of the problem and identify those who are responsible for it; in the second place we study the conditions—both subjective and objective, and so forth; in third, we try to overcome the problem by carefully planning the implementation of our ideas. We acted precisely according to this method in evaluating the economic reform.

Our analysis in this respect today shows that, along with the objective difficulties, which are enormous, there are numerous subjective obstructions to the reform, and that, last but not least, they can be identified with the government's economic team. It is within the possibility and competence of certain political forces to resolve this problem. Our approach to those who have power is based on principle—they were promoted to their posts by those who elected them and they expect them to solve the problems of their voters rather than to deal with their own, personal problems. We cannot possibly tolerate any lack of action.

[Lachanski] Well, in order to be more specific—you openly declare your attitude to Ministers Pushkarov and Kostov. Is there an alternative if they do resign?

[Trenchev] This is not our problem. If they ask us—we may indicate someone, we may approve some people—but this is a different question. The politicians have the say in this respect. We just assessed the situation. We commented on the facts by saying: "The job is not done." Since it is evident who is not doing his job, we name him to be even more specific. As far as the question of who is supposed to do a better job is concerned—it is a political problem. The functions of the trade unions are not supposed to go beyond this limit. Our duty is to point out facts. In other words, our slogan: "It is not important who rules, the important thing is how he does it"—is correctly applied in this case.

[Lachanski] Is any unity of action between the trade unions and the government possible?

[Trenchev] Yes, it is practiced in numerous countries all over the world. When a government is working for the interests of society (trade unions being a large part of society), then the relations between the government and the trade unions can develop in the form of a social dialogue. However, this is something that has been denied to us by the present government, or rather by its representatives. We consider such an approach as excessively risky, because it destroys the feedback mechanism. Those who rule do not receive the appropriate feedback from those whom they are supposed to rule over. This situation sometimes causes a conflict of interests, creates misunderstandings, and leads to an escalation of social tensions, and even involves the risk of an explosion of social unrest—a situation under which those who are ruled are more likely to survive than those who are ruling them. The simple reason for this is that the first group is infinitely more numerous than the second group, and last but not least, because it represents the nation, which is indestructible.

Dimitrov Comments on Trade Union Cooperation

AU1202111592 Sofia VEK 21 in Bulgarian No. 5, 4 Feb 92 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, by Rumyana Menkadzhieva; place and date not given: "Privatization Is Not a Cake That Leaves Behind an Empty Plate"]

[Excerpt] [Menkadzhieva] Prime minister, what is the government's approach to the occupation of the "Bistritsa" Residence [by Podkrepa Labor Confederation members] and to the further development of the conflict?

[Dimitrov] From a legal point of view, no one is entitled to confiscate someone else's property. This is perfectly clear. There is a formal request filed by Finance Minister Kostov for handing over the building, and the Prosecutor's Office has also announced its view on the situation—all this prompts us to wait for things to be clarified.

As far as the purchase of shares from the "Bistritsa" Residence by Podkrepa is concerned, I cannot commit myself to a definite opinion, although I have been quoted on the subject. Nevertheless, we have sufficient reason to believe that the shares were illegally supplied to Podkrepa. This is an offense for which the responsible side should be subject to sanctions. Evidently, it does not affect Podkrepa, because as the Bulgarian popular saying goes, "It is not the one who eats the cake who is guilty, but the one who gives it to him." In this particular case, the one who distributed the aforementioned cake should bear the consequences.

[Menkadzhieva] Mr. Dimitrov, has the economic reform really been delayed, and what will the government's forthcoming steps look like in this connection?

[Dimitrov] If we consider the reform in the context of time, assuming that it started in February 1991 and establish that no progress has been achieved since July 1991, then it is natural to acknowledge a delay. However, it should be attributed to the fact that the former government totally failed to provide a legal basis for the economic reform. It left the government alone to struggle with the reform and made the parallel introduction of structural and stabilization measures impossible.

So far, we are still lacking the legislative basis for reform. Nevertheless, if you ask me whether the reform is being delayed today, I would not agree, because we cannot expect parliament to pass 10 bills at the same time. We should, nonetheless, consider the possibility of drafting a series of bills that could be adopted within a short period. The situation is very serious and if we were unable to undertake any specific actions in connection with privatization by the end of February 1992, there is great danger that we might "get out of touch" with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and that our irrevocable slide "down the hill" may begin.

Nevertheless, there is still something else of which I am afraid. It is the commonly held opinion that if privatization starts at this particular moment "numerous naughty people with dirty money" will be the ones to purchase everything and nothing will remain for the others. This is very dangerous insinuation. It is true that numerous people are likely to try laundering their dirty money, but something else is true. Many of them are likely to be "caught" (I cannot guarantee that all of them will be). People seem to imagine privatization as something like a cake: As soon as it is cut into pieces, whoever comes first grabs his share and runs—which leaves an empty plate. Things do not work this way in the economic sphere. The more you cut from the cake, the larger it grows. This is so, because production produces wealth which can be invested in new production.

Yes, reform has indeed been delayed, but there is nothing to prevent us from pursuing it.

[Menkadzhieva] Is cooperation between trade unions and the government possible under the present circumstances?

[Dimitrov] The rumor about the alleged interruption of dialogue between the trade unions and the government can be refuted by the fact that one of my first actions as prime minister was to invite representatives of the trade unions for talks. We cannot solve all questions in the manner proposed by Podkrepa. The trade unions will not participate in the executive power. No one should ever question this rule, and if the opposite should happen, then the government should resign as a whole.

It would be much easier for me if special commissions were in charge of negotiations with the trade unions, so that I should not be personally confronted with such situations at all times. We are in favor of establishing such commissions and discussed the question with all trade unions. Conditions for cooperation exist and we are ready to engage in it, but consultations are required to clarify our stands and reach mutual understanding. [passage omitted]

Havel Not Testifying in Trial; Health Reasons Cited

LD1302132492 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] For health reasons, President Vaclav Havel will not testify as a witness tomorrow in the court trial of the former leading officials of the Federal Interior Ministry Frantisek Kincl, Alojz Lorenc, and Karel Vykypel. This was announced today by the press department of the presidential office. The source did not rule out that the new date for Vaclav Havel's testimony will be announced on Monday, 17 February, at the regular meeting with journalists held at Prague Castle.

Slovak Council Fails To Pass Draft Treaty

LD1202224292 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 2130 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Correspondent Maria Hluchanova report from the Slovak National Council Presidium session in Prague; in Slovak—recorded]

[Text] The most keenly awaited point on today's agenda was the treaty drafted last week by the joint commission of the two [Czech and Slovak] parliaments. The Slovak National Council [SNC] Presidium's vote on the draft was suprising. Of the 20-strong Presidium, 10 voted for and 10 against. Those who voted against were the representatives of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, the Party of the Democratic Left, and the Slovak National Party and also some deputies from the Christian Democratic Movement, Javorsky and Klepac, and two (?other) deputies, Zemko and Hykisch, were also against.

After the SNC Presidium session ended Frantisek Miklosko said that today's session could be described as a suspension of the talks on the treaty. He also said that concluding a treaty is not possible at this time. In the next few days he would like to meet with Dagmar Buresova to agree on what action should be taken next.

Press Roundup of Accord on Czech-Slovak Treaty

AU1202090892

[Editorial Report] Czech and Slovak newspapers on 10 February publish commentaries, as well as politicians' statements, on the successful conclusion of talks between Czech and Slovak parliament representatives at Milovy on 8 February on "the draft treaty on the constitutional arrangement of the common state." Most commentaries express relief at what they call an "unexpected" compromise but caution that the draft will still have to be approved by the parliaments of the two republics. Statements by two Slovak participants in the Milovy talks express skepticism about their outcome (Lubomir Ftacnik from the Party of the Democratic Left) or reject it outright (Jozef Moravcik from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia).

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 10 February on page 2 carries a 600-word Ivana Vajnerova commentary entitled "Victory for Law." Vajnerova opens her commentary by saying: "Following moments of hopelessness, the protracted series of talks between the two national councils on the constitutional arrangement of the state ended this weekend with an unexpected victory for law and constitutionality. Unexpected because, up to the last moment, the majority of Slovak representatives viewed this principle with the condescending smile of a revolutionary whose aim is the exact opposite—to destroy and transgress the law."

Vajnerova lists the demands that had been voiced by the Slovak side in the course of the negotiations (such as that the federal and republican constitutions have the same legal force and that conflicts between them be settled by the Constitutional Court or that the Slovak side have parity representation in the federal government), pointing out that "the Slovak side has been gradually backing away from these demands, for which it was unable to provide rational and legal arguments." Vajnerova expects a complicated debate on the draft in the Slovak parliament as "the soil of the Slovak National Council is far more fertile for emotions than for rational arguments."

She concludes the commentary by drawing attention to a number of remaining potential stumbling blocks: "A few questions remain to be answered: First, whether the sudden harmony between the Czech and Slovak representatives at Milovy signifies a true turnaround in Slovak politics. Second, whether the text of the treaty will not divide Federal Assembly deputies into two camps—those who will regard the assumed obligation to 'okay' the national councils' draft as a humiliating diktat unworthy of the supreme legislative body and those who, on the contrary, will consider the draft 'too federal.' And, finally, whether also the new political representation that will emerge in Slovakia from the elections will be ready to 'squeeze' into the federal framework."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 10 February on page 1 carries a 450-word Roman Krasnicky commentary entitled "The People." The commentator focuses on one aspect of the draft, the "shrewd" compromise concerning the wording of the preamble about participants in the treaty. As Krasnicky points out, the treaty will be concluded neither between the republics (as demanded by the Slovak side) nor between the national councils (as demanded by the Czech side) but "by the people of the two republics." Krasnicky qualifies the "comeback of the word 'people' into the political jargon" as "somewhat surprising" as "after 1989, the word disappeared from the vocabulary of our statesmen, with the possible exception of Alexander Dubcek."

Krasnicky cautions that, despite the compromise on the draft treaty, the "Czech-Slovak dispute is latently present." He says: "A certain belittling of the new wording of the preamble by Frantisek Miklosko, who emphasized the significance of the first chapter of the

treaty, which refers to national states and their sovereignty, suggests that the discussion of the text drafted at Milovy in the parliaments will bring with it a number of complications."

Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 10 February on page 1 carries a 350-word Petr Novacek commentary entitled "The Battle Has Not Been Won Yet." Novacek points out that, under the agreement reached at Milovy, "the treaty will become a joint initiative of the national councils toward the Federal Assembly, and not an independent source of law." As a result, the "sovereignty of the common state under international law, and its internal integrity, will not be disrupted." Novacek views the agreement of Milovy as "major progress in the process of Czech- Slovak settlement" but adds that "it would be premature to sigh with relief" because the draft must still be approved by the national council plenums.

Even if the two national councils failed to approve the draft, Novacek continues, the agreed contents of the treaty will at least allow the Federal Assembly to complete the discussion of the first three chapters of the constitution. "And that in itself is not a small achievement," the commentator says in conclusion.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 10 February on page 3 carries a 700-word Stefan Hrcka commentary entitled "Unexpected Compromise." Hrcka says that, while an agreement on the system and structure of the supreme bodies of the common state and on the division of powers between the republics and the common state was to be expected, the agreement on who will conclude the treaty is "remarkable" and "an unexpected compromise." Hrcka believes that the compromise formula is acceptable to both sides—to the Czech side because it gives priority to the civic principle over the national principle and to the Slovak side because "it is closer to its original proposal."

In concluding, Hrcka cautions that the compromise of Milovy "concludes only one stage of the road toward the treaty on Czechoslovakia's future arrangement" and that "the political struggle for the treaty has not yet ended." Hrcka expects, in particular, the extent of the powers of the common state and the question whether the Slovak parliament should not vote on the draft only after the adoption of a Slovak constitution to become "a matter of contention in the Slovak National Council."

Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 10 February on page 1 carries a 500-word commentary by Ivan Simko, deputy to the Federal Assembly, who participated in the Milovy talks on behalf of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). Simko believes that the draft treaty agreed upon at Milovy is a "big success of the one-year-long marathon of talks" on the future form of the Czechs' and Slovaks' coexistence. Simko emphasizes the fact that it was the KDH which first came up with the concept of a treaty as the foundation of the common state and that, initially, the Czech side "vehemently rejected" this idea. He therefore expresses "certain pride" at the fact that the KDH "pushed through what it had proposed—the new coexistence between Czechs and Slovaks will be based on an accord between them. It will be coexistence between equals, coexistence between partners."

Simko believes that the draft treaty is a "good proposal" as it "lays the foundations of the Slovak Republic's and the Czech Republic's new position in the common state, the position of sovereign entities." He expresses the hope that the deputies of both parliaments will "grasp the importance and beneficial nature of this treaty and will vote for it."

Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 10 February on page 2 carries a 700-word interview with Lubomir Ftacnik, member of the Slovak National Council Presidium, who represented the Party of the Democratic Left at the Milovy talks, by Marian Bednar entitled "We Will Have To Give It Serious Thought." Asked whether the compromise formula about the participants in the treaty is acceptable to the Slovak parliamentary opposition, Ftacnik says: "It is impossible to be unequivocal. Basically, we have only obfuscated the whole matter. It is not transparent from the formula whether the republics are subjects of the treaty." As the question whether the republics are participants in the treaty has not been unequivocally answered, Ftacnik continues, "the opposition will have to give serious thought to the question of whether the treaty reinforces the position of the republics. Likewise, we will have to formulate our stand on the very nature of the treaty, which is based on the constitutional status quo that the Czech side is trying not to change. We, on the other hand, feel the need to create something new."

Asked what position the SDL will assume on the draft treaty, Ftacnik says: "We will be cautious. We will have to think everything through once again."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 10 February on page 3 carries a 600-word statement by deputy Jozef Moravcik, entitled "A Treaty That Is Not a Treaty."

Moravcik, who participated in the Milovy talks on behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, flatly rejects the outcome of the talks there. According to Moravcik, Milovy "bore witness to the definitive burial of the idea of a state treaty." The text drafted at Milovy "is neither a treaty between the republics nor a treaty between the national councils but an agreement between the presidiums of the parliaments of the republics that they will submit the agreed text to the plenum of the national councils for a vote." In Moravcik's opinion, the Slovak participants in the expert commission, particularly Docent Hollaender, assimilated the Czech position that the legal status quo does not allow the republics to conclude a state treaty and that, had such a treaty been concluded, it would have no legal validity. In this way the Slovak experts in the commission "significantly assisted the Czech side in eliminating whatever

remained of the efforts of the Slovak coalition parties to preserve the torso of the original concept of the state treaty."

Moravcik challenges the view that the treaty must be based on the legal status quo and argues that "it is quite common in every sphere of law, including international and constitutional law, to change the legal status quo by abolishing it and replacing it with something new."

In concluding, Moravcik expresses the opinion that the text drafted at Milovy "provides the Czech side with the political guarantee that the existing concept of Czechoslovak federalism has been confirmed and, what is more, it creates scope for the further development of this concept in its centralized form."

Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 10 February on page 2 carries a 400-word "Statement by Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence Deputies." The statement, which was issued on 9 February, reviews the results of the Milovy talks and states that "Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence deputies will support the wording of the draft treaty that was adopted at Milovy after demanding and responsible talks." The statement expresses the conviction that "Slovakia can achieve prosperity only in a federal and democratic Czechoslovakia" and qualifies the Slovak opposition parties' "casting of doubt" on the Milovy draft as "part and parcel of their efforts to break up Czechoslovakia and to assert in Slovakia a left-wing socialist economy."

Slovak Deputies Call For Dobrovsky's Resignation

LD1302123692 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1900 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] The Defense and Security Committees of both chambers of the Federal Assembly discussed today the progress made in the redeployment of the armed forces and in particular the Air Force. They were reacting to requests made by Slovak deputies from the Assembly, Slovak National Council deputies, and Slovak officers lodged with the chief military prosecutor to start an investigation against unknown persons in the case of alleged shortcomings in securing the defense of Slovakia.

Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky and Lieutenant General Karel Pezl, chief of the General Staff, gave an exposition. Jan Slota, a Slovak National Party deputy, stated in the debate that the level of armed forces combat capability is low. He claimed that the threat to Slovakia is greater than the threat to the Czech Republic and called on the Defense and Security Committees to express no confidence in Lubos Dobrovsky. He called on the defense minister to resign from his office. Lubos Dobrovsky asked for the text to be confiscated from Deputy Slota and handed over to the Office of the Military Prosecutor because it contains state secrets.

In a resolution, the committees asked the defense minister to submit by 22 February a written report on progress in the redeployment of the armed forces.

Difficulties in Arms-Civilian Conversion Reported

LD1202183892 Prague CSTK in English 1709 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Bratislava Feb 12 (CSTK)—Arms production at the Turcianske Strojirny division of the heavy engineering works at Martin, central Slovakia, constitutes 40 to 50 per cent of the plant's turnover, the plant's temporary director, Viliam Dubovicky, told reporters today. He said problems in the process of converting arms manufacture to civilian production are being caused by the unfavourable economic situation in Czechoslovakia. He said greater independence in decision-making concerning contracts would be helpful.

He said the federal government has specified countries to which tank exports are not allowed. Syria will pay Czechoslovakia 225 million USd for the sale of 250 Czechoslovak tanks. Dubovicky said there are potential foreign investors in Czechoslovakia's civilian production, but they lack legislative guarantees. Privatisation in Slovakia should help ease this, he said.

Dubcek Discusses CSFR Ties, Bos Dam Agreement

AU1102140292 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 8 Feb 92 pp 1,3

[Interview with CSFR Parliament President Alexander Dubcek by Lajos Kovacs; in Satoraljaujhely on 7 February: "The Border Line Will Remain Unchanged"]

[Text] Alexander Dubcek finished the second, and last, day of his visit here in northern Hungary. He laid a wreath at the Slovak writer Pavel Orszagh Hviezdoslav's memorial in Miskolc, and then he visited the library of the Presbyterian College in Sarospatak. Alexander Dubcek left Hungary after getting acquainted with the Slovak school in Satoraljaujhely and the Comenius Teachers' Training College. Prior to his departure, Alexander Dubcek gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG.

[Kovacs] What information have you collected about the situation of the Slovak minority in Hungary?

[Dubcek] I could not get direct information about this because I have not visited Hungary since 1968. On the basis of information gathered from newspapers, during my talks, and during my discussions with the representatives of the Slovak national minority, I can say that preparations have been made for measures that will broaden the education of this people in their mother tongue. However, this is not enough, because nothing happened in this area in the past. The situation here cannot be compared at all with the one we already achieved in this area in Slovakia.

[Kovacs] Our bilateral relations are burdened by the Bos-Nagymaros power station project. Do you think that certain extremist groups are making use of this issue to incite nationalism and anti-Hungarian feelings in Slovakia?

[Dubcek] The power station issue is an objective issue. We cannot hide the fact that this difference of views exists. However, that the minorities should be afraid is news to the Slovak people. However, I must say that the Hungarian position on the power station issue is rigid and not sufficiently based on fact. In our view, the unilateral halt in the construction was carried out without professional preparations and negotiations. The contracts oblige us, and both sides have to bear the consequences.

The other problem is what people in Hungary think about diverting the bed of the Danube River. The amount of water flowing in the old river bed does not affect the border line. The border has been there and must continue to be there.

[Kovacs] When will you hold your next meeting?

[Dubcek] The environmental committees will hold another meeting this month, but a major Hungarian decision is needed for an agreement. We proposed to rely on the assistance of EC experts, but the Hungarian side has not yet turned to the EC with such a request. We hope that we will be able to avoid further delays.

Domestic Affairs Agreement Signed With Ukraine

LD1202223392 Budapest MTI in English 1907 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Kiev, February 12 (MTI)—Hungary and the Ukraine signed a domestic affairs agreement today. The agreement, signed by Hungarian Interior Minister Peter Boross and his Ukrainian counterpart A.V. Vasilishin, covers cooperation in police activity, prevention of international terrorism, fraud, human smuggling, the smuggling of art treasures, drugs, arms and drug trade and counterfeit.

The signing of the agreement invalidates the 1958 accords between Hungary and the Soviet Union. The ministers will also propose to their countries on setting up Interior Ministry representations within the two embassies. Hungary is the first country with which Ukraine signed such a key document, said Vasilishin.

The Hungarian delegation also met with Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deputy chairman on Tuesday. The delegation returned to Budapest this afternoon.

Arms Negotiations With Ukraine Reported

LD1202225392 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] The Hungarian Military Industry Office has held negotiations with competent officials of Ukraine about the purchase of military equipment [felszereles]. This was reported by State Secretary Jeno Laszlo, head of the newly formed office, to the National Assembly Defense Committee. He added that Hungary will pay with agricultural machinery for the Ukrainian military materiel [hadianyag]. The opposition view that too much power is concentrated in the hands of the Military Industry Office and that this is undesirable was also expressed at the committee session.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Belarus

LD1202180192 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] The Republics of Hungary and Belarus have established diplomatic relations as of today. The protocol on this, and the joint statement, were signed in Budapest by Foreign Affairs Minister Geza Jeszenszky and his Belarus counterpart Petr Kravchenko.

Before signing the documents, the two foreign ministers held talks. The topic of bilateral relations was the focus of the consultations. They stressed the need to develop real political and economic relations of full value between the two countries.

In the joint statement, the Hungarian party expressed its satisfaction with the fact that within the CSCE framework, the Republic of Belarus will join the all-European process. In his short statement given after signing the documents on establishing diplomatic relations, Foreign Minister Kravchenko stressed that with this signature the Republic of Belarus will return to Europe. This return will take place on two levels, on the political and economic.

Foreign Minister Kravchenko Comments

LD1202181692 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Correspondent Jozsef Havel report]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Following the signing of the documents establishing relations between Hungary and Belarus, [Belarussian] Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko emphasized:

[Begin Kravchenko recording in Russian fading into Hungarian translation] In concluding the agreement today, the Republic of Belarus is returning to Europe. This return will take place on two levels, economically and politically. The Belarussian foreign minister also said that his country does not consider Russia the sole successor to the former Soviet Union. As he emphasized, the surpluses and debts are inherited by every successor state. Regarding the nuclear problem, the Republic of Belarus is trying to establish a state free of nuclear arms. The greater goal is to establish a nuclear-free zone from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. [end recording]

Adria Oil Pipeline Still Closed Due to Politics

LD1202220492 Budapest MTI in English 1802 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Budapest, February 12 (MTI)—Although technically there is nothing wrong with the Adria pipeline, it is still closed due to political reasons, Hungarian oil and gas PLC managing director Gabor Jozsef told MTI. Since the shutoff of the pipeline 16 September 1991, Hungary receives oil from Russia only. No date has been set for resumed operation of the pipeline but Jozsef did not rule out the possibility it will be re-opened in March.

It would be useful for all sides to hold a conference where Croatia, Hungary, Serbia and Slovakia could discuss economic and political changes affecting their ties. Despite the Adria pipeline problem, oil supplies are flowing to Hungary uninterrupted from Russia through the friendship pipeline.

As the Hungarian Government last year introduced an obligation to store strategic oil supplies for a year, i.e., 5 per cent of all oil imported, at present, Hungary has supplies enough for a month, Jozsef said.

Paks Nuclear Plant Converted to Private Company

LD1302100492 Budapest MTI in English 0814 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Budapest, February 13 (MTI)—The Paks nuclear power plant company has been converted into a public limited company [PLC], chief executives told a rally on

Thursday. Hungary's biggest electric power-generating unit has been operating with a capacity of 1760 mw since October 1987, producing 41 million kwh a day. (The first 415-mw bloc was put into operation on November 3, 1983.)

The measure was part of the transformation of the Hungarian electricity trust into a two-tiered public limited company. The assets of the system will be managed and its wholesale operations carried out by a central unit, controlling 15 affiliated PLCs, including the Paks power plant.

Democratic Forum Explains Role of Faction Director

AU1302095692 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 11 Feb 92 p 3

[Interview with Imre Konya, Hungarian Democratic Forum faction leader, by Tibor Moldovanyi; place and date not given: "Faction Director in the MDF Group—For More Effective Implementation of Party Policy"]

[Text] [Moldovanyi] What justifies the creation of the position of faction director?

[Konya] The structure of the democratic parliament differs considerably from the old structure because the democratic parliament contains factions of deputies. The structure of these factions developed in several stages. A well-organized operation needs several modifications, and this process is still going on. The faction leader is unable to cope with all the small details of organizational, operational, and managerial tasks directly connected with the job of being a parliamentary deputy. In view of this, and taking the West European experience into consideration, the parliamentary faction of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] decided to modify its organizational and operational statute and create the position of faction director to be filled by a deputy.

[Moldovanyi] Will the director be elected or appointed?

[Konya] Given that the position is not political, the faction leader will nominate the most suitable person, on the proposal of the presidium. At the same time, the faction can prevent the appointment of any person whom it does not trust. That is because there must be consensus in the faction on the appointment of the faction director.

[Moldovanyi] What will be the task of the faction director?

[Konya] He will have to manage the faction on a continuous basis and decide on daily issues. We are talking here about the daily problems of 160 deputies. So far, this coordination has been working rather clumsily, mainly because of overwork. We expect smoother cooperation between the presidium, the faction, and the working groups. We were seeking a manager-type deputy with good organizational ability to fill this position, and we decided to appoint Pal Becker. Although he is very busy—he is the deputy chairman of the Budget Committee—his professional skill and great working capacity will ensure that he will carry out his new tasks adequately.

[Moldovanyi] If the faction loses confidence in him, can it recall the director?

[Konya] No, because it is not an elected position. Naturally, the deputies will have an opportunity to express counterproposals, but the decision remains the responsibility of the faction leader. The elected presidium proposes both the nomination and recall of the faction director.

Maxwell Sells 40% Share in ESTI HIRLAP

LD1202214592 Budapest MTI in English 1952 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] London, February 12 (MTI)—The Maxwell concern has sold its 40-per-cent share in the Hungarian daily ESTI HIRLAP to Hungary's HIRLAPKIADO (journal publishers), an Arthur Andersen auditing company spokesperson, the Maxwell concern's legal representative told MTI today. HIRLAPKIADO had purchase priority and, at the same time, it was the highest bidder, the spokesperson said.

According to the spokesperson, the selling contract does not extend to the protection of ESTI HIRLAP staff. The owners, only condition was to sell their share to the highest bidder. ESTI HIRLAP editor-in-chief Denes Maros resigned tonight.

Talks are underway about the Maxwell concern selling its share in the Hungarian daily MAGYAR HIRLAP and a Budapest printing shop, the spokesperson said, refusing to specify any dates.

Walesa on Government Power To Issue Decrees

LD1202235592 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 2230 GMT 12 Feb 92

[No video available]

[Text] Deputies' parliamentary floor groups have been meeting. Some of these agreed on their positions regarding the election of the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK] chairman. Solidarity, the Peasant Accord [PL], and Labor Solidarity will vote for Zbigniew Romaszewski. The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] will support, from now on, NIK Chairman Piotr Kownacki.

Democratic Union [UD] deputies have decided to direct drafts of the small constitution and a new electoral law to the Sejm speaker. The draft constitutional law assumes the possibility of the government issuing decrees having the force of law during breaks in sessions. These would not, however, cover changes in the Constitution, the electoral law, and citizens' political and personal affairs. President Lech Walesa also spoke of this during a meeting with representatives of Polish Radio and Television.

[Begin Walesa recording] As the system is being changed we encounter an absence of laws or old laws. Another set of issues is the breaking of laws. Something must be done with these two—the breaking of laws and the creation of new laws—because we are ineffective due to a system full of holes. And so, as regards this subject again, let the Sejm, for example, not amend its laws at every sitting. It is better for the government to make legislative mistakes in the guise of decrees, and later, observing this, the Sejm will create more farsighted and wise laws. Thus, it is precisely within this whole subject of law and order and legal loopholes that we must create possibilities for decrees, and we must also create possibilities for decrees in relation to the subject of reprivatization, so as to close this subject in one go. The man who made it on time, well that's his affair; for the one who didn't we must activate proper privatization. We know, for example, that the Warsaw Steelworks had a good sponsor who wanted to go in there, but it transpired that there was an allotment inside, measuring 100 meters, which had an owner. Now that Italian doesn't want to continue because he said, look, he'll go inside and break up my enterprise. So we must act quickly as regards these two subjects, and speedy action means, precisely, decrees. Again, we have to set things up in such a way so that if there are mistakes or something highly unfavorable, the parliament at any moment can put a stop to unfavorable aspirations so that these should not go against democracy. [end recording]

Deputy Defense Minister Submits Resignation

LD1202134792 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1200 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Janusz Onyszkiewicz has requested that he be relieved from the post of deputy defense minister. This was announced by Colonel Jan Szalaj, head of the deputy minister's secretariat.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz has occupied this post since April 1990, after being nominated by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Onyszkiewicz is a [Sejm] deputy and a member of the Democratic Union.

Committee Approves Privatization Program

LD1202191992 Warsaw PAP in English 1637 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 12—The socio-economic committee of the Council of Ministers (KSERM) approved Wednesday [12 February] the government's privatisation programme prepared by the ownership transformations sector.

It is anticipated that the government's opinion on the programme will be known on Friday.

Details on Privatization Plan

LD1202231392 Warsaw PAP in English 2157 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 12—The socio-economic committee of the Council of Ministers (KSERM) approved on Wednesday the governmental programme of privatisation worked out by the privatisation ministry.

The programme covers privatisation projects for the coming 2-3 years and includes both proposals of new measures to speed up and develop privatisation and the continuation of the privatisation process initiated in 1991. In 1992 the Privatisation Ministry plans to increase revenues from privatisation to some 7-10 trillion zlotys (600- 900 million dollars), including 1 trillion (90 million USD) in treasury bonds.

The programme of capital privatisation, the major source of revenues, envisages at least 8-10 public offers and a sale of 30-40 enterprises or companies in 1992. There are plans to privatise 400-600 small and medium-size state enterprises and 600-800 state farms by means of liquidation in 1992.

According to the plans, the long-term programme of mass privatisation, scheduled for ten years, should cover at least 50 per cent of state-owned industry in 1994. The programme, generally continuing the one started in 1991, includes, however, some modifications consisting mainly in the introduction of fees for participation in it, the linking of the plan with other programmes relating to the sphere of public finances, a social insurance system among them, and the increase of the number of enterprises covered by the programme to 400.

As concerns reprivatisation, the Privatisation Ministry is to work out a new reprivatisation bill and a draft law on a national reprivatisation fund in the first quarter of 1992. By the end of the year economic and organisational foundations for the programme are to be created.

Most of the reprivatisation claims, amounting to over 100 trillion zlotys (9 billion dollars), should be met by

the end of 1993, however the Ministry expects it will be impossible to satisfy them from the state budget due to the critical state of public finances. Therefore, it is proposed to set up a national reprivatisation fund to deal with selection, registration and administration of fixed assets to undergo reprivatisation.

Meanwhile, Deputy Privatisation Minister Janusz Krzyzewski told a Sejm (lower house) committee on Wednesday that reprivatisation would not cover the property situated on the eastern territories belonging to Poland before 1939, now held by the Ukraine.

The government is to take a stand on the privatisation programme on Friday.

Prime Minister, Solidarity Delegation Talk

AU1202104392 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Feb 92 p 2

[Pawel Tomczyk report: "An Unexpected Convergence of Views"]

[Text] Wednesday's [5 February] meeting attended by Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, Jerzy Kropiwnicki, minister of labor and social policy, and representatives of the "Solidarity" National Commission lasted over two hours. The union delegation was led by Marian Krzaklewski. The talks were held behind closed doors and came on the eve of the opening of comprehensive negotiations between the government and "Solidarity."

"We, as a union, have to make decisions and achieve results today. Prime Minister Olszewski is perfectly aware of the public pressure and expectations surrounding the outcome of these talks. It seems, however, that there will not be any disputes today, because there are questions, but no one who will answer them.... There is no minister of ownership transformation, no minister of finance, and no minister responsible in charge of the Office of Central Planning. I confess to being somewhat surprised," said Janusz Szewczak, a union expert, once the talks opened, but he added that that was his private, personal view. Andrzej Adamczyk, the "Solidarity" National Commission press spokesman, said that Wednesday's meeting marked the beginning of a basic stage in negotiations. Broadly speaking, the negotiations should concern two subject areas: social policy and policy to combat the recession.

"The prime minister was very keen to receive the "Solidarity" National Commission delegation on the eve of the commencement of negotiations" was how Marcin Gugulski, the government spokesman, described the meeting. He also said that the meeting was very useful, because it allowed a wide range of problems to be raised, including problems that will be covered by the negotiations.

"An enormous number of the problems raised by the trade unionists have been taken account of, sometimes by as much as 100 percent, in the documents that the government has been working on for a long time and are currently completing. This applies to the socioeconomic provisions for this year and the budget law...." The spokesman promised that trade unionists would be informed about the content of the documents as quickly as possible, that is, when the documents are passed to the Sejm.

On Thursday [6 February], during talks at the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the government side is to propose members of the working parties and a schedule for the negotiations.

"As I understand it, the union's proposals regarding the scope of the negotiations have been accepted," said the "Solidarity" National Commission spokesman following the meeting and added that the union was pleased that the prime minister had declared that he was ready to consider the problems that the union had highlighted.

"The prime minister said that a mechanism should be created that will allow the union to communicate information to the government in order to facilitate intervention with respect to concrete issues."

Union President Krzaklewski firmly rejected the view that the meeting had been merely a matter of courtesy and said that it had been frank and at times heated and that is why it had been important. In addition, he said that the measures for dealing with the problem of the energy price hikes that "Solidarity" had conveyed to the prime minister were still being considered and that a decision will be made in the next few days.

Maciej Jankowski, head of the Mazowsze region chapter of "Solidarity," described the talks at Wednesday's meeting as comprehensive: "I think that the things that the prime minister was saying and we were saying were convergent. I am never particularly optimistic, but I think one can say that we gained some time to work. It turned out that the government, the prime minister, and we, the union side, take a similar view of the current situation. That is already a great deal. It is quite unlike the talks that we had with previous governments, when hundreds of branch agreements were signed, but because the system was proceeding in a different direction, the agreements turned out to be worthless."

Government, Solidarity Teams View Economy

AU1102145892 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Feb 92 p 1

[Pawel Tomczyk: "Seven Lean Years?"]

[Text] During Thursday's [6 February] talks between representatives of the government (from the following ministries: labor and social policy, ownership transformation, trade and industry, construction, justice, internal affairs, and the Office of Central Planning) and a "Solidarity" delegation, it was decided that the problem of energy price hikes will be dealt with by a mixed team appointed specifically for this purpose.

The talks will begin at the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy on Friday [7 February]. Three other teams were also formed, and they will examine issues relating to social policy, economic policy, the law, and law enforcement (the State Treasury, anticorruption activities, and economic scandals).

Opening the government-"Solidarity" talks, Jerzy Kropiwnicki, minister of labor and social policy, said that the times when a government minister whose authority was derived from a source other than the will of the people pledged that the Sejm would pass something on behalf of the Central Committee, the government would implement it, and the court would register it are over once and for all. Following the free elections, the nation has taken national affairs into its own hands. The government has nothing to hide from society: In a situation in which "we have to share ever greater poverty, for which we are not responsible; decisions have to be made in full public view, and it must be possible to see all the workings of the decision-making process."

The head of the union delegation, Janusz Palubicki (acting on behalf of Marian Krzaklewski), said that despite the free elections, the situation in the country is still not normal, and that is why "Solidarity" still cannot limit its role to that of a trade union, although it does not want to be a political party. According to him, society keeps saying "Solidarity" is responsible for that, that is the fault of "Solidarity," but what is heard less frequently is that is a "Solidarity" achievement. According to Palubicki, responsibility for decisions and actions has become confused. That is why the union must raise the question of social justice. It can be expected that problems will be set out clearly by the first government to have a base in parliament.

Minister Jerzy Eysymontt, head of the Office of Central Planning, did not agree with Janusz Palubicki's assessment of the social situation in which the current government finds itself and said that Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government started out in an atmosphere of general enthusiasm and that Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's cabinet was in a better budgetary situation when it took office.

"There are five to seven years of hardship and economic poverty ahead of us, although it does seem to me that there is a chance of reducing that period." Minister Eysymontt said that he does not foresee the possibility of an increase in consumption in the immediate future and that society "should recognize that" if the government's economic plan is to be realized. "It will not be straightforward. If we move in the direction of egalitarian mechanisms, then structural changes will not be possible."

According to Eysymontt, an economy that functions relatively autonomously, that is, one in which there will not be a need for intervention, should be created by 1994. Directing efforts toward investment in a broad sense and "aggressive" exporting will mean that 1992 will see zero growth, and after that, one can expect a slight increase in the gross domestic product, 3 percent at the very most (while consumption will stagnate). The minister also announced that that education and the health should not have to be financed out of the state budget.

"Solidarity" expects the government to adopt a position on the solutions to the energy price hikes proposed by the union or to submit its own proposals and "ultimately, the government will have to put forward very serious arguments." If there is no response by Monday [10 February], we will treat that as being the same as a negative response. Andrzej Adamczyk, the "Solidarity" National Commission press spokesman, did, however, express the view that the mixed team will find a solution before Tuesday's [11 February] meeting of the "Solidarity" National Commission. Before the team was appointed, Ryszard Pazura, deputy minister of finance, reiterated Prime Minister Olszewski's view that the price hikes could not be rescinded. The talks should only concern relief measures.

Walesa Discusses Western Aid, Threat From East

AU1102161392 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 10 Feb 92 p 9

[Report on interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Jozef Hubel; place and date not given; italicized portions are SMENA report: "Exclusive Interview With the Polish President—in Strasbourg, I Did Not Mean Poland..."]

[Text]

I must sincerely admit that I was taken by surprise when Minister Andrzej Drzycimski, Polish presidential spokesman, phoned my apartment in Warsaw on Thursday [6 February] and invited me to the Belweder. Indeed, it is unusual for the president of a country to personally invite foreign reporters for an informal exchange of opinions. On the other hand, Lech Walesa showed once again that he is a frank person and that he does not try to pursue "cabinet policy". It is obvious that it was no coincidence that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983. Of course, the subject of the interview was open, yet it related mostly to Walesa's speech in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 4 February. The Polish president's speech there was one that none of the "European deputies" will ever forget. Of course, we also spoke about relations between Poland and the EC and about the internal political situation in Poland. Many Western papers interpreted Walesa's speech in Strasbourg as a tough criticism of the West for not having invested in Poland, preventing Polish products from access to their markets, and promoting Western assistance to countries in our region only in words. Lech Walesa gave us a surprising explanation.

[Walesa] A long time ago, I said that an aid package to the then Soviet Union could be the only solution to our tense situation in the Central and East European region. You reporters were afraid to write about it then! Now I

have been proven right, despite the fact that no one took me seriously at that time. As the chief of the Polish revolution, I had to react in this manner. I had exactly the same thing in mind in Strasbourg. If we do not all wake up, we are doomed, since the situation in the former Soviet Union can cause the destruction of Europe! This is why I am not talking about Poland now. Yes, we have problems, but we will tackle them. However, we cannot tackle the former Soviet Union.... We must not forget that "Soviet troops" are still in Poland (usually the number 45,000 is given), and Soviet troops are in Germany.... That is, I am not exaggerating at all when I say that the situation is really serious.

[Hubel] Why do you think so? Are you bitter because Western countries are mainly interested in the CIS, and only after that in Poland?

[Walesa] I do not agree, absolutely not. This is not a manifestation of nationalism, or xenophobia. It is an objective fact that Poles will take a beating once again. Someone is deceiving us. There is no threat of nationalism in Poland. We do not have such groups here. I am still saying that our problems will emerge only on our eastern borders. This is what I am warning everyone against.

[Hubel] Would it be more advantageous if Poland embarked on the road to the EC separately or jointly with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as you mentioned in Strasbourg?

[Walesa] Of course, I have never spoken solely about Poland. It seems to me that in the troika we do not cooperate as intensively as we could and should. Indeed, our cooperation cannot consist of meetings only between presidents and prime ministers. Cooperation must involve specific sectors and ministries. Many old regulations are blocking to us; the reform of our state administration is not fast enough, and this is why great uncertainty prevails in the existing structures. People in these structures do not know what is in store for them tomorrow. They are abandoning their good intentions and determination to support close coordination.

[Hubel] Do you think that cooperation is something that everyone talks about but nobody does anything about?

[Walesa] As I said, we have presidents and prime ministers to conduct talks. Because our cooperation is not flexible, the West has flooded us with their products and used our revolution to their own benefit. We, ourselves, have almost no benefit from our revolution! The West should be primarily interested in trade, and we should allow such development as to make this trade possible.

Walesa reacted more or less diplomatically to the recent suggestion by Jan Carnogursky, that is, to establish a narrow cooperation involving Poland, Slovakia, the Ukraine, and Hungary. He said that he would support regional cooperation for which we have good prerequisites. However, he considers it premature to establish such a group of four. As the main reason he gave the unstable political situation in the Ukraine and in our country—a situation that yields no guarantees.

Finally, the Polish president strongly stressed once again that he is not afraid of the East, as far as the military aspect is concerned. He is afraid, however, that a wave of hungry refugees from the former Soviet Union will flood into Polish territory, and this could cause an unforeseeable disaster. This is why he appealed to the West in Strasbourg and demanded to invest less in armaments and more in economic development. The same thing is true about our post-communist countries. By being open and prompt, Lech Walesa has proved again that despite of his working-class origin he is able to "beat" many intellectuals. With his attitude toward us reporters, he could also serve as a model to many politicians, since the people can learn what they should learn only when they are systematically informed from the highest level. The only cosmetic flaw is the fact that when he spoke about Czechoslovakia, and when he meant Czechs and Slovaks, he used the word "Bohemia" and "Czechs".... This was the moment when I did not feel good about the fact. This should not happen to a politician of his reputation. I felt uneasy when I reminded him of the fact that he meant Slovaks as well....

Failure To Use Western Bank Credits Noted

LD1202054492 Warsaw PAP in English 1840 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—Poland used only less than 2.8 per cent of funds for the development of transport granted by the World Bank and the European Investment Bank, said a report by the Supreme Board of Inspection (NIK) signed by its acting President Piotr Kownacki.

After a year that passed since the signing of credit agreements, the Transport Ministry and enterprises of the Polish State Railways (PKP) spent little more than 4.6 million dollars out of 170 million dollars that they had received. This is more than twice less than envisaged by a plan for modernization ventures supplied to creditors.

According to NIK, the main cause for the disturbing phenomenon was not offering 70 million dollars of Western credits to PKP technical subsidiary plants. They were separated from the PKP organizational structure and as independent enterprises could not take advantage of credits granted to PKP. They did not in time reach agreement with the World Bank on the principles of lending these funds to the newly set up firms. All this takes place when there is a need to swiftly modernize rolling stock and railway network.

NIK inspectors also say that instead of two million dollars that it received the Transport Ministry assigned only little more than half a million for the development of roads last year. This was primarily due to the incompetence of the general management of public roads,

linked to the purchase of modern control and measurement equipment to size up the quality of the road surface, NIK says.

Ostrowski, Dubynin View Soviet Troop Withdrawal

PM1102165692 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 27 Jan 92 pp 1-2

["CH" report: "Generals Clash: Dubynin Versus Ostrowski"]

[Text] Yesterday afternoon a vast edifice situated in downtown Legnica and previously used to host the so-called Soviet Army Officers Center was finally restored to Polish ownership. With full observance of the required protocol, Viktor Dubynin, commander of the Soviet troops in Poland, formally turned over the facility in question to Andrzej Glapinski, voivoda of Legnica, who in turn transferred it to the care of Wroclaw Metropolitan Bishop Cardinal Henryk Gulbinowicz. The event took place in one of the many halls of the former Officers Center and was attended by a large group of reporters, representatives of Legnica city authorities, clergymen, and officers of the Soviet Forces Northern Group and the Polish Armed Forces. Cardinal Gulbinowicz announced that, in conjunction with the planned establishment of a new Roman Catholic diocese at Legnica, the facility will be adapted to house the Bishop's Curia, the archbishop's ecclesiastical tribunal, the chaplaincy faculty, and a branch of the Papal Theological Academy. To this list, the Voivoda of Legnica added also a Catholic business school.

After the ceremony came the official launching of the business school, which will operate under the aegis of the Wroclaw Academy of Economics on the premises of the former Soviet museum. The building has not yet been formally transferred to the Polish side, but already 12 Polish officers are attending courses there, in addition to the 70 officers of the Soviet Forces Northern Group, and lectures are given by Polish specialists. The facility was adapted to the requirements of a teaching establishment by the Polish company Rembud. In addition to Voivoda Glapinski and Cardinal Gulbinowicz, the opening ceremony was also attended by General Dubynin and Professor Jozef Kaleta, rector of the Wroclaw Academy of Economics.

Later, a press conference was held for Polish and foreign correspondents. During the conference a particularly sharp exchange took place between General Dubynin and General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, the Polish Republic's government plenipotentiary for the Soviet Forces Northern Group's stay in and withdrawal from Poland. General Dubynin accused the press (including GAZETA ROBOTNICZA) and "certain politicians" of publishing "non-objective" information on his troops' withdrawal. "If you continue to placidly accept such disinformation," General Dubynin warned, "one day you will wake up and find the Soviet troops gone." At the beginning of 1989 there were 58,000 personnel of the Soviet Forces Northern Group stationed in Poland. Since the launching of the withdrawal process, 23,000 troops have left Poland; in the fourth quarter of 1991 alone, 1,740 railroad truckloads of equipment left Poland, as did 266 tanks. General Dubynin stressed that the Russian troops continued to leave Poland despite the failure to sign the final agreements on the matter. By 15 November 1992 all combat units will have left Poland, and all the payments owed to the Polish side for the troops' transit from Germany will have been paid.

In reply, General Ostrowski expressed surprise that there was a need to call the press conference at all. He also questioned the procedure whereby the Officers Center was handed over to the Polish side. "You cannot officially transfer a facility which you only leased from the legal owners," he said. As regards the numbers of troops being withdrawn, General Ostrowski pointed out that the border guard services could only record the numbers of troops crossing the border by land routes, whereas additional troops could be leaving the country by air or sea routes. There were no border crossing control posts at the airports used by the Russians. This was the reason for the discrepancies in the reported numbers of troops leaving the country. Unless the Soviet Forces Northern Group volunteered the information themselves, the numbers would be reported according to the figures available to Polish observers.

The Russian side owes Poland huge sums for the lease of premises, for the transportation of troops, and for the power and food supplied to the forces stationed here. In reply to Dubynin's accusation that the Polish side was deliberately delaying the financial settlement of accounts for the costs of stationing the Soviet Forces Northern Group in Poland, General Ostrowski commented at length on the matter, stressing the Polish side's readiness to negotiate the many contentious issues and to settle the whole matter fairly and squarely.

General Dubynin declared that by 1994 the last soldiers of the Soviet Forces Northern Group will have left Poland. He also asked for two to three months in which to repay the debts. "Do not play up those millions—no, billions," he corrected himself—"which we owe you. After World War II we fed you, which also cost us billions, and no one claimed credit or asked to be repaid for that help."

The conference was conducted in a tense atmosphere. General Dubynin insisted that the decision to leave a 6,000-strong group of the military in Poland in 1993 to service the transit of troops did stemmed not from his mistrust of the Polish Government or people, but from the fact that there will be 250,000 tonnes of stocks waiting to be transported out of the country and also that it would be necessary to provide communications links for the troops withdrawing from Germany. Finally, both generals appealed to the reporters present to show integrity and objectivity in their accounts of the meeting.

Defense Ministry Estimates 'Survival' Budget

LD1302111292 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] This year around 3 trillion zlotys will be required for the survival of the defense industry to ensure the minimum quantity of orders. The outlays for the first quarter only allow the Ministry of National Defense to pay off the debts for equipment supplied to the army last year.

Economic Ministry Official on Trade With CSFR

LD1202222292 Warsaw PAP in English 1840 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 12—Polish trade experts on Wednesday said that the maintaining of the current level of turnover between Poland and Czechoslovakia requires broad promotion of Polish products in Czechoslovakia.

Boleslaw Krawczyk of the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations told a press conference here that last year's turnover between the two partners reached 1.2 billion zlotys, with Poland's imports being higher than its exports.

The ministry official expressed an opinion that one of the most positive aspects of last year's trade contacts between Poland and Czechoslovakia was the fact they did not collapse after the introduction of hard currency settlements as was the case with trade between Poland and states of the former Soviet Union.

Poland and Czechoslovakia plan to stage two fairs this year, the first in Prague in March, to promote the production of small and medium size enterprises.

Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity Holds Congress

AU1202203792 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 10 Feb 92 p 2

['TOT' report: "Opposing Ethnic Discord"]

[Text] The First General Congress of Polish-Czech-Slovak Solidarity has been held in Wroclaw.

The delegates expressed their opinion on the meeting that took place between Prime Minister Olszewski and Stanislaw Gawlik, a representative of the "Coexistence" movement, which maintains that interests of the Polish minority in Zaolzi do not enjoy sufficient protection. The congress adopted a a declaration in which it disapproves of all attempts to use the issue of national minorities to cause tension between the Republic of Poland and the CSFR.

The declaration states: "We believe that calling into question the Treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations, Solidarity, and Mutual Cooperation, which was signed in Krakow on 6 October 1991, is dangerous and runs counter to the interests of both states. We are surprised by the declaration issued by the Federation of Border Region Organizations and articles in the Polish press that mentions discrimination against Poles living in Slezko Tesinsky in the CSFR, depicting it as a consequence of the treaty. In addition to these views, there are the statements being made by the multiethnic political movement "Coexistence," which operates in the CSFR, and criticism of the treaty being voiced in the Sejm. The highest authorities of the Republic of Poland are taking notice of these views, although the movement has no mandate to represent all the Poles living in Czechoslovakia."

The idea for Polish-Czech-Slovak Solidarity originated in the 1970's during meetings between activists from the Social Self-Defense Committee KOR and Charter 77. Clandestine meeting were attended by Vaclav Havel, Petr Uhl, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, Jan Litynski, Antoni Macierewicz, and many others.

During the 1980's Polish-Czech-Slovak Solidarity organized secret meetings between opposition politicians on the border. It was involved in smuggling underground publications across the border and in exchanging information and experience on fighting the totalitarian system.

Hungarian, Polish Ministers Eye Cooperation

LD1202053192 Warsaw PAP in English 2218 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—The speaker of the Sejm (lower house) Wieslaw Chrzanowski, hosted a meeting Tuesday attended by the Hungarian interior minister, Peter Boross, and his Polish opposite number, Antoni Macierewicz, according to the information office of the Sejm Chancellery.

The sides discussed the legal problems connected to the evaluation of the previous half century in both countries and the practical consequences. Cooperation was proposed in this field, to be undertaken by representatives of the interior ministries of both countries.

Ukrainian Deputies Visit, Meet Skubiszewski

AU1302103792 Warsaw PAP in English 1553 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 10—The Ukraine has no dealings with Germany behind Poland's back, the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, Dmytro Pavlychko, said Monday, discussing Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk's visit to Bonn recently.

Pavlychko, deemed number 2 official in the Ukraine, is the most prominent figure of a delegation of Ukrainian parliamentarians who came to Poland February 9 to take part in a symposium on defence organized by the Polish Institute for International Affairs. The symposium started at Jadwisin near Warsaw Monday.

Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski received the Ukrainian politicians in Warsaw Monday to discuss both bilateral relations, including a Polish-Ukrainian treaty on good-neighbourliness, and domestic developments in the Ukraine and its relations with Russia.

Central Planning Office Head Receives Moldovans

LD1202052592 Warsaw PAP in English 1652 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 11—Jerzy Eysymontt, head of the Central Planning Office and chairman of the governmental socio-economic committee, received Tuesday a Moldovan delegation headed by Minister of Economy and Finance Konstantin Tampiza.

We want to maintain friendly relations with all our neighbours as it is a basis for the reconstruction of economic relations and their future expansion on new economic principles, Jerzy Eysymontt told PAP.

Eysymontt briefed the Moldovan visitors on the problems of the Polish reform. They were particularly interested in the methods of maintaining a stable currency rate while pursuing economic transformations.

The Moldovan delegation also met with Minister of Agriculture and Food Economy Gabriel Janowski. The agreement on economic cooperation which was signed on Monday was vastly concerned with agriculture.

South Africa's De Klerk Ends Polish Visit

AU1202112292 Warsaw PAP in English 1758 GMT 8 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 8—On the second and last day of his official visit to Poland, president of the Republic of South Africa Frederik Willem de Klerk, who is also head of his country's government, received in his Warsaw residence on Saturday Prime Minister Jan Olszewski. The two discussed above all economic issues, with particular emphasis on trade exchange and cooperation in various industrial branches.

The two statesmen expressed the conviction that it is necessary to consolidate cooperation, including economic, between Poland and the RSA. Poland regards the RSA as her most important potential partner in Subsaharan Africa. The Republic of South Africa on its part recognized the essential role played by Poland in this part of Europe and thus is interested in stimulating cooperation through investments in Poland, an official communique said.

Jan Olszewski expressed Poland's recognition and support for the course of changes in the RSA.

In the opinion of President De Klerk, the processes taking place in Poland should make the African National Congress leadership realize that the programme of building a socialist economy is erroneous.

At a press conference that followed, President De Klerk expressed his great satisfaction at the full diplomatic relations established between the two countries, the agreements on economic cooperation that had been concluded, and the abolition of visas for holders of diplomatic and business passports from the two countries.

South Africa is proud of her contribution to the liberation struggle waged by Poles during the last world war, De Klerk said, referring to the supplies that had been dropped by his fellow-countrymen to help the Warsaw insurgents of 1944. For their heroic feats the Polish president had granted crosses of the Warsaw Uprising to over 50 South African pilots.

President De Klerk said that all three countries that he had visited, that is Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, face similar problems and difficulties, but they also differ from one another in various aspects. The RSA wants to help them, mainly through trade exchange.

Referring to the reforms being introduced in his country, President De Klerk said he was thankful to the Polish authorities for their understanding for the democratization processes taking place in the RSA.

President De Klerk with his wife and his entourage left Warsaw Saturday, bidden farewell at the Okecie Airport by President Lech Walesa and Mrs Walesa, Prime Minister Jan Olszewski and other high ranking officials.

Further Reportage on 9 Feb Local Elections

Romania Mare Complains of Irregularities

AU1202140392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1232 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 12/2/992—The first objections were addressed to the central polling commission by the "16-21 December Revolutionary Association" and "Romania Mare" Party. The former contends that in Bucharest observers of the "Pro Democratia" Association and delegates of the Democratic Convention were urging voters to vote for "the key" (the electoral sign of the Democratic Convention), that in places voters' lists were doubled, certain buildings assigned to several polling stations, some voters omitted from the lists.

"Romania Mare" Party contests, on the strength of information furnished by its representatives in the polling commission of sector 1 Constituency, Bucharest, the validity of the election returns in seven polling stations. While showing that the parties drawn for representation in these stations' polling committees were represented by more than one delegate, in disregard of Article 24 of the Local Election Law, "Romania Mare" nominally contests a number of 11 persons.

On the other hand, Mihai Vuscan, vice-president of the National Salvation Front [FSN] organisation of Sector 1, Bucharest stated to the press that "in most of the polling sections of sector 1 Bucharest, the Democratic Convention had 2-3 representatives, while the FSN had only one, in compliance with the law."

Dimbovita County Results

AU1202164492

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 1400 GMT on 12 February carries a 5-minute report by Victor Spirache from the Central Electoral Commission, who says that "so far today, only two more counties, Covasana and Salaj, have sent in their final electoral results." He adds that "a delegation from Satu Mare has also arrived in Bucharest, but they lost some of the vote count reports and had to return to Satu Mare." The reporter then gives some partial results from mayoral elections in Arges, Braila, Mures, Neamt, and Sibiu Counties, mentioning that "a runoff will be necessary in all Jiu Valley towns."

At 1600 GMT the station carries a 3-minute Spirache report on "some official results from Dimbovita County." He says that people voted in 82 constituencies; "new elections will be held in four of them, because fewer than 50 percent plus one cast their votes." He adds that a runoff is needed in 45 constituencies. According to Spirache, "33 mayors were elected, as follows: 29 from the National Salvation Front [FSN]; two from the Romanian National Agrarian Party [PDAR]; one from the Democratic Convention; and one independent." As for the elections for local councillors, "1133 councillors were elected in 78 constituencies: 504 from the FSN; 234 from the Democratic Convention; 185 from PDAR; 52 independents; and other political groups."

Mures, Calarasi, Gorj Counties Results

AU1202205592

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania in Romanian at 1700 GMT on 12 February carries a five-minute report by Victor Spirache from the Central Electoral Commission, "the last direct link for tonight," on "further official results that have come in since the last newscast at 2000 hours [1800 GMT]." Spirache says that "we now have official results from three other counties: Mures, Calarasi, and Gorj."

According to the reporter, "in Mures County, voting took place in 97 constituencies. New elections will be held in one of them, while a second ballot is needed in 31 constituencies. Sixty-five mayors were elected, as follows: 19 from the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], 15 from the Democratic Convention, 13 independents, 10 from the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [UDMR], and eight for the National Salvation Front [FSN]." He then proceeds to give figures of the elected local councillors: "Total elected councillors—1,241, of which 484 from UDMR, 394 PUNR, 168 FSN, 61 the Democratic Convention, 56 independents, 37 the Romanian Agrarian Democratic Party [PDAR], and so forth."

Concerning Calarasi County, Spirache says that "voting took place in 53 constituencies; new elections will be held in one of them, while a second ballot will be organized for the position of mayor in 27 electoral wards." He adds that "25 mayors were elected, of which 18 are from the FSN, six are independents, and one is from the Democratic Convention; 710 councillors were also elected, of which 377 are from the FSN, 150 are from the Democratic Convention, 90 from the PDAR, 53 are independents, and others representing various other political groupings."

As for Gorj County, the reporter says that "37 mayors were elected, as follows: 32 from the FSN, three independents, one from the Democratic Convention, and one from the Democratic Left Union. A second ballot will be organized in 28 constituencies, while new elections will be held in five constituencies." He adds that "local councillors were elected in 65 of the 70 constituencies."

Spirache ends up his report mentioning that "12 counties have thus far reported the official results of the 9 February 1992 ballot."

Vaslui, Braila, Caras-Severin Results

AU1202192092

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania in Romanian at 1700 GMT on 12 February carries a 2-minute report by Victor Spirache from the Central Electoral Commission on official results from Vaslui County.

He says that "voters cast their votes in 75 constituencies; a runoff is needed in 42 constituencies." He says that the 33 mayoral posts were divided as follows: 27 to the National Salvation Front [FSN], five to independents, and one to the Romanian Democratic Agrarian Party [PDAR]. The 998 mandates for local councilors were allocated as follows: 540 to the FSN, 151 to the PDAR, 145 to the Democratic Convention, 73 to the Ecologist Movement, 28 to the National Liberal Party, 18 to independents, 16 to the National Liberal Party-Young Wing, and the rest to other political groups."

At 1800 GMT the station carries a 4-minute Spirache report which says that "so far, official results were received from nine counties: Bistrita-Nasaud, Bacau, Prahova, Teleorman, Salaj, Covasna, Vaslui, Dimbovita, and Braila." He proceeds to report on results from Braila County: "23 mayors were elected, of which 22 from the FSN and an independent; a second ballot is needed in 20 constituencies for the mayoral position." Referring to results of the elections for the position of councilor, he adds that "314 belong to the FSN, 91 to PDAR, 60 to the Democratic Convention, 28 independents, and 568 to other political groups."

During the same newscast, the announcer says that "our correspondent from Caras-Severing reports that the County Tribunal validated the elections in all 77 constituencies," adding that "in 27 of them elections concluded after the first ballot, with 19 mayors belonging to the FSN and five to the Democratic Convention. A runoff is needed in 49 localities and new elections will be held in only one constituency. In the city of Resita, the runoff will match an independent candidate and the representative of the Democratic Convention."

Counting Errors Delay Results

AU1202131092

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 1100 GMT on 12 February carries a five-minute report from the Central Electoral Commission in Bucharest in which the president of the Central Electoral Commission, Judge Gheorghe Uglean, explains why there has been a delay in announcing the elections results.

Judge Uglean says that, when "the election results were verified by the Central Electoral Commission, some calculation errors were noted regarding the vote totals, the establishment of electoral percentages, and in the allocation of mandates."

"In order to ensure the correct application of the provisions of the election law and real election results, we have asked the electoral commissions to verify the ballot-counting," and, "if errors are noted, to take measures to correct them" before forwarding them to the Central Electoral Commission.

Judge Uglean does not say when the final result may be expected.

Opposition Candidate Leads in Bucharest

AU1202195292 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Excerpts] From the Bucharest Electoral Commission, our reporter Mihai Cutus told us that, with 87 percent of the votes counted in the capital, the situation is as follows: Crin Halaicu of the Democratic Convention received 45.92 percent of the votes; Cazimir Ionescu of the National Salvation Front 31.34 percent; Radu Theodoru of the Romania Mare Party 6.84 percent; Calin Popescu Tariceanu of the National Liberal Party-Young Wing 4.13 percent; Ion Bratianu of the Bratianu Liberal Union 1.57 percent; and Nica Leon of the Free Democratic Party 1 percent. The other candidates for the position of Bucharest general mayor obtained less than 1 percent. [passage omitted]

Judge Dr. Gheorghe Nedea, chairman of the Bucharest Municipality Electoral Commission, said that final results in the capital will be announced around 2400.

Further Counties Report Results

AU1302121392

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania in Romanian at 1100 GMT on 13 February carries an eight-minute report by Tudor Stanciu from the Central Electoral Commission in Bucharest on final election results received from five more counties. In Harghita County, where "votes were cast in 58 constituencies, mayors were elected in 51 constituencies as follows: 37 from the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [UDMR]; 7 independents; 2 from the National Salvation Front [FSN] on joint lists with the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]; 1 from the PUNR; 1 from the Romanian Ecological Movement; 1 from the FSN on a joint list with the UDMR; 1 from the Romanian Agrarian Democratic Party [PDAR]." He adds that the "UDMR candidate was elected mayor of Miercurea Ciuc, the county seat."

In Tulcea County, "mayors were elected in 25 of the existing 48 constituencies, as follows: 20 went to the FSN, 2 to the Democratic Convention, 1 independent, 1 to the Russian-Lipovan community, and 1 to the Ukrainians' Union." A second ballot will be organized in 23 localities, "including Tulcea Municipality, where the runoff will be between the FSN and the Democratic Convention candidates." Regarding the councillor elections, "of a total of 622 mandates, the FSN won 300 mandates; the Democratic Convention 148; PDAR 81; the Russian-Lipovan Community 36; independents 26; the Ukrainians' Union 14; the Republican Party 4; the Romanian Mare Party 3; the Romanian Ecological Movement [MER] 2; and the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party 1."

In Neamt County, "voting proceeded in 72 constituencies, and mayors were elected in 35 of them, as follows: 23 went to the FSN; 5 to the PDAR; 1 to the Democratic Convention; and 6 to independents." A second ballot is

needed in 39 constituencies, including in Piatra Neamt Municipality, where the runoff will be between the FSN and Democratic Convention representatives." As for the councillor elections, "the 928 mandates were allocated as follows: 464 to the FSN; 191 to the Democratic Convention; 190 to the PDAR; 32 to the MER; 10 to the National Liberal Party [PNL]; 7 to the Romanian Ecologist Party [PER]; 4 to the PUNR; 103 to independents; the rest went to other parties."

In Galati County, "mayors were elected in 21 of the 60 constituencies, as follows: 15 went to the FSN; 2 to the PNL; 3 to PDAR, and 1 to the Democratic Convention. A second ballot is needed in 39 constituencies, including Galati Municipality, where the runoff will be between the representatives of the Democratic Left Union and the Democratic Convention." As for councillor mandates, "the FSN won 346, the PNL 150; the Democratic Convention 129; PDAR 154; independents 29; MER 14; other political groupings 24."

In Caras-Severin County, "out of 77 constituencies, mayors were elected in 27, as follows: 17 went to the FSN; 5 to the Democratic Convention; 1 to the Union of Croats; 1 to the Romanian Social Democratic Party; 1 independent. A second ballot is needed in Resita Municipality between a representative of the Democratic Convention and an independent."

After this report, Judge Gheorghe Uglean, president of the Central Electoral Commission says that "the candidates who came out first and second in the first poll and will participate in runoff ballot may continue their election campaign" under the conditions envisaged by the law, that is "up to 2 days before the date of the second poll." He adds that "there where new elections are needed due to the fact that less than 50 percent plus 1 of the registered electors cast their votes, the candidates for the positions of mayors and councils may continue their campaign under the same conditions, that is, in the press, on the radio, and television. These elections will be held two weeks from now, on 23 February, using the same lists of candidates and the same electoral lists."

Suceava Results; Runoff in Bucharest

AU1302083092

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania in Romanian at 0500 GMT on 13 February carries a five-minute report by Tudor Stanciu from the Central Electoral Commission on the "latest data after last night's calculations of the 9 February local elections." Stanciu says that, in addition to the poll results from 12 counties that were released yesterday, "results from local elections in Suceava County also arrived here shortly before 0700 [0500 GMT] today." Stanciu says that "votes were cast in 98 Suceava County constituencies. Mayors were elected in 34, as follows: 30 from the National Salvation Front [FSN], two from the Democratic Convention, one from the Romanian Agrarian Democratic Party [PDAR], and one independent. Local councils are being set up in all 98 constituencies in accordance with the electoral results."

The reporter adds that, "in Bucharest, half an hour ago, after 99 percent of the votes have been counted, the results are as follows: For the position of Bucharest general mayor, Crin Halaicu of the Democratic Convention obtained 45.94 percent; Cazimir Ionescu, FSN, 31.45 percent; Radu Theodoru, Romania Mare Party, 6.76 percent; Calin Popescu Tariceanu, the National Liberal Party-Young Wing 4.13 percent. These figures indicate that a second ballot is needed, with the participation of the first two candidates, that is Crin Halaicu of the Democratic Convention and Cazimir Ionescu, from the FSN." Stanciu adds that "councillor mandates for Bucharest Municipality were allocated as follows: The Democratic Convention 32; FSN 23; Romania Mare Party six; the National Liberal Party-Young Wing three; the Ecologists two; and one mandate each for the Free Exchange Party, the PDAR, the Romanian National Unity Party, the Bratianu Liberal Union, the Romanies Alliance, the Social Democratic Salvation Front, the Democratic Left Union, the National Party of Free Producers, and the Republican Party."

The announcer adds that "final results from Bucharest will be known by the end of the day," while "data from the counties may require another day or two."

Runoff Elections on 16 or 23 Feb

AU1202195492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1915 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 12/2/1992—The government's weekly session was held at Victoria Palace under the chairmanship of Premier Theodor Stolojan.

Secretary of State at the Local Public Administration Department Doru Viorel Ursu informed the cabinet about the preliminary data of the local elections from the point of view of the government's attributions. He specified that new elections were to be held in 66 constituencies. Given the fact that no one of the candidates got half plus one of the number of voters in 1,344 constituencies, another ballot is to take place on February 16 or 23 according to the respective constituencies' option.

Approaching the items on the agenda, the premier showed that to apply the decision the government took last week with regard to spring farming operations, an 80-billion lei fund was to be set up to finance them. Credits are to be granted from the fund with an interest rate of 15 per cent, which is half of the market's interest.

The governor of the National Bank, Mugur Isarescu, presented the cabinet the conclusions on the negotiations with the IMF for an accord on loan for 1992, which refers to the need to fight inflation and take measures apt to prevent it and to make up for the arrears that amounted to 1,800 billion lei.

In connection with the energy situation to the day, the minister of industry pointed to the critical state of coal stocks that reached a limit, and requested urgent opening of credits for imports.

The executive also debated at its session today the question of public transport tariff. It decided that starting February 15 it should stand at 10 lei, with season tickets and subway transport tariff remaining unchanged. This measure affects only 18 per cent of the number of Bucharest passengers.

Iliescu on Economy, Corruption, Tensions

PM1202172092 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 7 Feb 92 p 4

[Report on interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu by Cees Zoon in Bucharest; date not given]

[Text] The 9 February local elections are the beginning of a new democratic Romania. President Ion Iliescu is convinced that the country's murky past will now be finally laid to rest, because democracy will also become a reality at the lowest administrative level.

"These elections form the basis of a democratic structure, because there is now legislation to the effect that local authorities will be given autonomy, and will be able to operate more independently. The process of decentralization is not only being implemented in the economic field, but also in the field of government. The climate in which the elections are taking place is totally free. Political life is now free, and must now be reinforced in the new institutions that are being formed at local level. The reforms must improve the situation in every municipality."

Ion Iliescu (61) has been president of Romania for almost two years. Directly after the December 1989 revolution the former communist blossomed into the strong man of the National Salvation Front, and was elected president in 1990 by an overwhelming majority. However, since then his popularity has waned substantially. According to the opposition—and according to Prime Minister Petre Roman who was fired in September—Iliescu is still a full-blooded communist who has no real democratic impulses. Proof of this are the two violent expeditions to Bucharest by miners which were supposed to have been ordered by the president personally.

[Zoon] How democratic is Romania now?

[Iliescu] As far as the democratization of political life is concerned, we have achieved most things. The changes have been most profound in the area of freedom and human rights. Our biggest problems are the economy and social life and living conditions. The uprising in December 1989 was in part a result of the socio-economic crisis into which Romania had drifted.

Everyone expected that after the revolution living conditions would improve right away. However, in practice the transition from a centrally directed economy to a market economy is a very complicated process which has given rise to another crisis: economic stagnation, a fall in production to 65 percent compared with 1989, inflation, unemployment. All these things have led to problems in people's daily lives. Seen from this point of view, for ordinary people democratization is a very intellectual expression of ideas. They only see democracy from the perspective of their everyday lives; they want a better life.

[Zoon] How important are the elections for the country's image? There is a great deal of skepticism about Romania abroad.

[Iliescu] We have now created the necessary conditions—including the legislation—to build a real democracy.

[Zoon] Romania's image was probably damaged by the behavior of the miners, for example.

[Iliescu] Alas, we have the miners. The French have the farmers and strikes by medical personnel. In Germany you have all manner of demonstrations that are violent, even demonstrations by fascist organizations, with all their xenophobic implications. Thus you find examples of the confusion of modern-day society in many countries. And we have the miners.

[Zoon] Are you disappointed with the West's approach to Romania?

[Iliescu] Yes, of course. We had expected more understanding and solidarity in this very difficult period. The wish that democracy should develop here should have led to greater solidarity. Through helping our reforms, through opening lines of credit to solve our problems. Because all these internal processes—we have dissolved the old structures, with all the consequences that this brings with it—went hand in hand with the liquidation of Comecon which has brought problems to all the East European countries, chiefly in the field of energy and raw materials.

This has been reinforced by the Gulf crisis in which we lost important oil suppliers—Iraq. And oil is our foremost source of energy, and is needed for the petrochemical industry. We have the capacity to refine 35 million tonnes of oil, but we produce only 7 million tonnes. The rest has to be imported. Last year we used only 17.5 million tonnes. We are no longer able to buy oil, because we have no foreign currency. The credit lines are needed to offset the problems cuased by the disappearance of our former sources.

[Zoon] Does Romania receive less support from the West than other East European countries?

[Iliescu] Absolutely. And not only for political reasons. It is also a result of the general state of the world economy. Even the richest country, the United States, has financial problems. The rich countries have problems and the banks have to give large credits to countries in the Third World and also to the countries of Eastern Europe.

There is also another problem, our bankers have told me. Romania has no foreign debt. That was seen as an advantage, but now seems to be a disadvantage. If we had had debts, the banks would have been more interested in Romania. No debts mean that we are not on their list of priorities.

[Zoon] The opposition says that the old nomenklatura is still in power. Is that correct, in your view?

[Iliescu] You know, it is the opposition's job to oppose, and so they are always looking for things they can use in their criticism. But it is not true. What does "nomenklatura" mean? If you take the whole of the present government, you will find no one who had close ties with the old nomenklatura. Perhaps I could be come in for some discussion in this connection. I did have some positions of responsibility in the old system; I was minister of youth affairs.

But from 1971 onwards I was viewed by intellectuals as one of the best-known critics of Ceausescu. Many people knew me, expressed their sympathy for me. I was constantly persecuted, and was in danger as an active oppositionist. And you can find others. Also, it is impossible to find anyone who had no links with the old system. And this is not a criterion by which to judge people, for you are then creating a new class division.

[Zoon] Are you a nostalgic communist, as former Prime Minister Roman has described you?

[Iliescu] Ha ha. Roman himself has no less reason to be nostalgic. For he is the son of the old communist fighter, Waltre Roman, who was in the resistance in Spain, during the war. This is not the criterion by which to judge people. I think that the facts speak more for a different position. No one can feel nostalgia today, for every right-thinking person understands that this process is irreversible. It is impossible to go back, the only possibility is to go on along this road. Not with slogans and by labeling people—that is no fundamental criticism. You must look at what someone does.

[Zoon] How are your relations with Roman now, after all the unpleasant things which the two of you have said about each other everywhere?

[Iliescu] We had very close ties, and personally I have very great sympathy for him. He is a young man with a great deal of promise. But now relations are very cool. He sees it as a political opportunity for himself to break off our relations like this.

[Zoon] So it is not a matter of a difference in view over the reforms or the speed of them?

[Iliescu] I do not believe that we disagree about the principles for the development of the country. There are other, personal differences of opinion.

[Zoon] How great is the chance that the National Salvation Front will fall apart?

[Iliescu] That possibility certainly exists. But I am unable to concern myself with that process, because I am no longer a member of the Front. According to the Constitution, I had to leave the party the moment I was elected president. And I have no direct links with internal party activities.

[Zoon] The parliament has set up a committee of inquiry into corruption in the Roman government, with which you worked closely. What do you think of this?

[Iliescu] On the one hand it is not a good thing, because it is being linked to the firing of Roman and can be used against him personally. That is bad for the respect for politics. On the other hand, there were many rumors, discussions in the media, about corruption. An objective analysis by this committee could create clarity and remove suspicions.

[Zoon] Many people are disappointed with the trials against those who committed crimes during the revolution. Are you satisfied?

[Iliescu] The trial of those politically responsible has been delayed, that is disappointing. The first statement by the court rejecting responsibility has been contested by the public prosecutor. The December events, in which around one thousand people were killed, are another matter. The authorities entrusted with the inquiry have not succeeded in finding those guilty of all these crimes. Naturally we are all concerned about this, but it is impossible to form a clear picture of any revolution. The violence was so chaotic, that it is difficult to clear things up. The Americans have not been unable to solve the murder of one person, the president, and that was almost thirty years ago. Here there was such anarchic violence that it is almost impossible to find the guilty.

[Zoon] Do you tnink that people who committed crimes before the revolution in the name of communism should also be brought to trial?

[Iliescu] Perhaps. There are some initiatives in that direction.

[Zoon] Do you think this is desirable, or do you think that it is better to forget the past?

[Iliescu] That depends on the climate in the country. Sometimes it is better to clear things up, if the climate is calm. But it is not the obvious course of action when there are major social tensions.

[Zoon] There are some extreme nationalist tendencies in Romania. How great is the danger that these get out of hand?

[Iliescu] They are the product of the socio-economic situation, of the crisis. For centuries Romanians and Hungarians have lived together in harmony. Now all socio-economic conflicts rapidly acquire ethnic connotations. But I hope that we will overcome these. The new constitution guarantees freedom for all minorities; their

rights are a vital component of democracy. We are the only country in the world where all these groups are represented in parliament.

[Zoon] According to many critics, the new secret service, SRI, is a direct continuation of Securitate. How true is this?

[Iliescu] Yes, that is the slogan. This is also to do with the image that some people want to keep alive. In Hungary there has not been a single change to the secret police: The structure has been retained, and the personnel. The only change was the appointment of a new director. And you do not hear anyone in Hungary talking about it. But the Romanians have a talent for making public their own problems and disagreements.

We are perhaps the only East European country that has liquidated its secret police—as long ago as the night of 22 December 1989. Only a few technicians, specialists, have remained, but they have never had anything to do with repressive activities.

Trade Unions To Hold Nationwide Rallies

AU1302101792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1853 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 12/2/92—The "Fratia" Trade Union Federation, the "Alfa" Trade Union Cartel and the National Free Trade Unions Council of Romania, gathered in the National Consultative Trade Union Council held a news conference on Wednesday afternoon.

The National Consultative Council was set up on November 9, 1991 to face the wave of social problems in the wake of the government's intention to change the exchange rate [of the national currency].

The leaders of the three trade unions showed that—in consideration of the major implications it entailed—there were long negotiations between trade unions and government, "a kind of lack of communication, not a deadlock, being reached."

Consequently to sensitize the government to the trade unions' claims, the National Consultative Council told the news conference it would organize a rally in the capital city on February 14. Similar events will be arranged the same day in several large towns of the country.

Interview With Security Chief Magureanu

AU1302123692 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 5 Feb 92 pp 1, 4

[First of several installments of interview with Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, by Ralu Filip; place and date not given: "We Do Not Interfere in Political Games"]

[Text] [Filip] Some articles of the law on the organization and operation of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] have caused controversy. For instance, Article 43: "An autonomous corporation and production trading company may operate within the SRI under parliamentary control, in accordance with its own requirements, and strictly observing the law..." What do you say about this?

[Magureanu] I did not have the idea of carrying out economic activities within autonomous corporations or trading companies in order to become a state within a state or to obtain uncontrolled sums of money for obscure actions. Given the precarious situation of the country's budget, especially our budget, we tried, on the one hand, to produce certain goods that were needed, primarily foodstuffs, and on the other hand, to manufacture equipment we need for our work that we would otherwise have to import at great cost. And we do not have that kind of money. The fact that we have to observe the law, with its very clear provisions, and that our activity is under strict control shows that we do not intend to carry out harmful operations as some publications suggest.

[Filip] Specifically, what kind of economic activities are you talking about?

[Magureanu] First, I am talking about an agricultural unit that produces foodstuffs, grains, and meat and milk products in order to meet the consumption needs of some of our units. In our view, such activities are normal, because other such institutions also have such a production system. At this point it is difficult to procure everything we need through the usual network; on the other hand, we are talking of productive activities and not of profiteering or unlawful activities; in this way we shall be able to obtain a great deal of strictly necessary equipment for our work.

[Filip] We have been used to a huge and overequipped Securitate apparatus. We are also obsessed with stories or rumors in connection with the unlawful economic activities of the former Securitate....

[Magureanu] Indeed, the Securitate apparatus was huge because—aside from the specific tasks of any security body—it also carried out many illicit operations. I have clear proof of this and I have already initiated action to trace secret funds deposited in the obscure accounts of the former Securitate. There is no use in hiding anything. No matter whether the amount of such money was exaggerated or not during the former regime, undoubtedly, such funds, which were diverted from their normal purpose, existed!

[Filip] You say that the SRI lacks technical equipment. It is difficult for us—simple citizens—to believe that the Securitate was not well-equipped....

[Magureanu] You see, this has to be clarified. In a number of areas such as, for instance, counterespionage,

radios and modern equipment for the detection of possible hostile foreign intervention have never matched requirements. Certainly, there were a lot of other complex equipment and devices for things like listening to telephone conversations and censorship of letters... understandable, because, instead of dealing with normal things that are customary for an institution in any democratic country, the whole system was meant to survey the people.

[Filip] How can these economic activities be controlled?

[Magureanu] There are several control levers. The SRI report will be presented in front of the Supreme Defense Council; however, a constant and careful control of economic activities will be ensured by the parliamentary commission whose direct task it is to supervise the SRI.

[Filip] Do you think that this is enough to dispel suspicion?

[Magureanu] There are actually other manners of control; first on the part of public opinion, which—through the press and the other media—will constantly be informed about the various aspects of our economic activity.

[Filip] Another disputed article is the one stipulating that, upon the request of the leader of the given public establishment, autonomous corporation, or trading company, the SRI will verify and provide information about people who will occupy positions involving state secrets.

[Magureanu] Checking people who will have access to state secrets is a customary task of any intelligence service; what we try to do—while respecting basic human rights—is to make available only strictly necessary information that will ensure the most correct description of such officials. Such information is not compulsory for the given leaders, but I think that it can be useful for the selection of truly valuable people in our society.

[Filip] Are the former interrogators of Directorate I and VI still part of the SRI?

[Magureanu] Most of them were removed before the SRI was set up....

[Filip] Are you sure that the SRI no longer has "leftovers?"

[Magureanu] The process of sifting our personnel, which is a genuine and long process, will resolve this aspect. We have removed incompetent, unsuitable, or compromised people from the ranks of the SRI.

[Filip] I understand, however, that they have regrouped within other services and have the feeling that great injustice has been done to them....

[Magureanu] What I want to publicize on this occasion is the fact that we have confronted numerous cases where people belonging to the former Securitate were not loyal enough. The moment they were removed, they proceeded to attack the SRI. I am sorry to say this, but most of them deserved their lot.

[Filip] Suspicion of the SRI continues to exist. How do you think it can be reduced? What guarantees do you offer people in the sense that the SRI is completely different from the former Securitate?

[Magureanu] Many things remain to be done about guarantees and transparency. We will have to openly tell the public what the objectives of our activity are and, at the same time, avoid violating basic human rights in any way. On the other hand, our credibility will increase together with the efficiency of our activity. This is an objective that is difficult to implement and needs more time than we thought at the beginning.

[Filip] Is the SRI and are you, yourself, involved in politics?

[Magureanu] Despite appearances, which sometimes were unfavorable, we will never interfere in obscure political games that will be to the advantage or, on the contrary, to the disadvantage of any person or political organization.

Bishop Tokes Warns of Ethnic Conflicts

AU1202191792 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 12 Feb 92 p 4

[Otmar Lahodynsky report: "In Romania the Old Methods Are Employed—Tokes Warns About Bloody Nationality Conflicts"]

[Text] Brussels—In Transylvania he receives anonymous threats of murder in the mail, just as he did in the past under Ceausescu. A self-styled "people's court" has even sentenced him to death and has offered killers a reward of $150,000. Official pressure has also been exerted on the courageous clergyman. Bishop Laszlo Tokes was called upon by court ruling to clear out of his office of the reformed church in Oradea last week.

The 40-year-old bishop says in a DIE PRESSE interview that "the regime employs the old methods and techniques from the Ceausescu era." He adds: "In 1989 I was expelled from my office in Temesvar. Now I am bishop and must leave the building that was occupied by communists for 40 years and is our legitimate property. We reject this illegal expropriation." The militant bishop, who in Belgium was awarded an order by the "Union of European Federalists" and was received by the Belgian king and numerous politicians, publicly criticizes the Romanian Government and above all President Ion Iliescu.

"For him to accuse the West of not helping Romania enough shows that he confuses the cause and the effect. The reason the West helps so little is the terrible way the present regime governs."

Bishop Tokes, whose persecution and expulsion by the Securitate in December 1989 led to the national uprising in Temesvar (Timisoara) and as a consequence to the overthrow of the Romanian dictator, is still concerned about the situation of the Hungarian population in Transylvania. He says that there is disappointment and frustration. "The people are demoralized. They have no hopes, no confidence in the future."

According to Tokes, only the supply situation has improved. For instance, a nearby meat combine ensures that people in Temesvar can buy enough meat now. The smear campaign against the Hungarian population is, however, continuing, even though more subtle measures are employed now than under Ceausescu. Tokes speaks about "indirect and peaceful intimidation" when commenting on the fact that rebellious Hungarians are threatened with the loss of their jobs.

The bishop says that in the regional elections last weekend [8-9 February], candidates of the "Hungarian Democratic Alliance" were fought with various tricks. In Tirgu Mures, where bloody ethnic conflicts took place in March 1990, the Hungarian candidate for the office of mayor, Istvan Kiraly, was canceled from the ticket by court ruling because of "lacking moral integrity." Romanian nationalists, in particular the radical front, "Vatra Romaneasca," still "see Hungarians as second class citizens."

Tokes says that despite the restrictions imposed by the authorities in Hungary, the emigration of Hungarians in Transylvania is continuing. Since there are many guest workers in Hungary because of higher wages, it is difficult to estimate the number of emigrants. Over a longer term, however, Bishop Tokes predicts a similar fate for the Hungarians in Transylvania as the Romanian Germans and the Jews had. As in former anti-Semitic campaigns, many Romanians now label the Hungarians as scapegoats, and this is exploited for political purposes.

"The fact that Transylvania was part of the Hungarian Kingdom or an independent principality for more than a thousand years is not addressed," says Tokes. There is, however, hardly any chauvinism within the Hungarian group.

After the overthrow of Ceausescu, Romania should have worked up its past and carried out a purge. Like in public service, in his church, too, too many people of the Ceausescu era are staying on in their posts. The most important parsonages had been filled by Securitate member Bishop Papp, his predecessor in office, said Tokes.

Tokes is also worried that the nationalism instigated by the political leadership in Bucharest could also lead to the forming of armed groups as happened in Yugoslavia. "Hundreds of frustrated Securitate agents" would be prepared to join a new version of the "Iron Guards," warns Tokes.

Belarus Foreign Minister Kravchenko Arrives

AU1302131692 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Mr. Petr Kravchenko, minister of foreign affairs of the Belarus Republic, arrived in Bucharest this morning on an official visit. The chief of Belarus diplomacy was met at the airport by Mr. Adrian Nastase, the Romanian minister of foreign affairs.

The first round of talks will take place this afternoon at the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the schedule, Mr. Kravchenko will be received by Romania's President Mr. Ion Iliescu and by Prime Minister Mr. Theodor Stolojan.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Nastase Spain Visit

AU1202201692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1929 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 12/2/1992—During his press conference of February 12, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Traian Chebeleu, appreciated that the visit paid to Spain by Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase over February 4-6 "had in general very positive results."

He emphasised that the signing of the Treaty on the Relations of Friendship and Collaboration Between Romania and the Kingdom of Spain marked "the beginning of a new stage in bilateral ties."

Romania's broad openness towards the world, the wish for a permanent dialogue with all states in the mutual interest, for the benefit of international understanding and collaboration, of a new stage freed from the cold war problems, Ambassador Chebeleu also said, is illustrated also by the political contacts at the beginning of February. Noteworthy in this context are the visits paid to Romania by Mahmud Vaezi, deputy foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, by Joaquim de Lemos, ambassador, director of Angola's Department for Europe, as well as by the delegations of the relevant organisms in Sweden, Norway and Finland to negotiate the arrangements concerning the granting by those countries' governments of credits representing their contribution to the financial assistance in support of Romania's foreign balance of payments.

Both the endorsement of the Constitution and the organization of free elections in Romania will help eliminate certain reserves the U.S. Administration and, especially, the U.S. Congress still have against our country, stated the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, at his weekly meeting with press representatives. He expressed his hope that after the second ballot scheduled for February, the Bush administration would submit the bilateral trade agreement to the congress for reification, which also includes the provision for Romania's being granted the most-favoured-nation clause.

In another sequence of ideas, Mr. Chebeleu showed that the U.S. secretary of state's visit to Chisinau [Kishinev] would not bring about a reorientation in Romania's foreign policy. Our opinion on the Baker-Snegur dialogue is positive, he said. Commenting on Mr. Baker's assertion on the occasion, according to which Moldova's union with Romania depended only on the two peoples' will, being a question of no concern to the American state, Mr. Chebeleu stated that the American position on the matter was the right one.

I think the U.S. secretary of state's visit to Chisinau is a positive moment in the relations between the Republic of Moldova and the U.S.A., said the Foreign Ministry spokesman adding that the dialogue with the U.S.A. benefited the Romanian people.

Requested to comment at this February 12 press conference upon the article the spokesman for the Romanian Presidency, Alexandru Mironov, contributed to January 23-30 issue of the publication "TOTUSI IUBIREA" (STILL LOVE) on the activity of former U.S. ambassador to Bucharest, Mr. Alan Green Jr., the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu specified:

The article does not evince an official point of view despite the author's post. As a matter of fact, President Iliescu himself said the respective article did not reflect his opinion.

We at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have another opinion on Ambassador Alan Green's activity during his mission in Bucharest. He made a significant contribution to expanding Romanian-U.S. ties, to normalizing them, to getting substantial humanitarian aid for Romania from the U.S.A., maybe the most important one of Western countries, to U.S. assisting the democratization process and the transition to a market economy in this country.

Ambassador Green was friendly to Romania and the Romanian people, and showed understanding for the difficulties the country has to overcome in this transitional period.

Referring to the Romanian Foreign Ministry's statement during the CSCE ministerial council's debates in Prague on waiving the principle of consensus on decision making at the CSCE level, Foreign Ministry spokesman Traian Chebeleu specified at his Wednesday meeting with mass media representatives that Romania agreed to the principle of making decisions according to the partial-consensus rule without taking into consideration the option of the state involved, called during the conference "consensus minus one," on matters regarding the violation of human rights, of democracy or the state of law in one participating country or another, yet such an attitude created a precedent which allows for the involvement of the international community in the domestic life of a state in the case of deliberate or unintentional mistakes.

Ambassador Chebeleu showed along this line that a concerted campaign of slanders conducive to artificially creating internal tensions could be directed against one country or another, a situation which would not justify the international community's interference, though the consensus-minus-one rule might entitle it to commit itself to undertaking penal actions.

Romania considers that before the "consensus minus one" principle is adopted, a court should be set up apt to define a state of affairs as falling within the principles stipulated by the consensus minus one, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out.

International

SFRY Delegation Departs for Moscow Visit

LD1202122392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1018 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—A Yugoslav delegation left for Moscow today at the invitation of the Russian Government. Mladen Skobalj, under secretary in the Secretariat for Labor, Health, War-Veteran Affairs and Social Policy and chairman of the FEC Commission for Humanitarian Affairs and Dispersed Persons, left with it. This is the first official contact between the governments of the Russian Federation and of our country since the break-up of the USSR.

Sergey Shoyga, a Russian Federation government member and chairman of the State Committee for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and the Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters, will be the Yugoslav Government delegation's host in Moscow.

During their three-day stay in Moscow, the Yugoslav delegation and their hosts will exchange views on the possibility of cooperation between the two countries in the area of medicine and medical equipment supplies and on the formation of joint enterprises for the manufacture of these and other products, says the FEC Secretariat for Information.

UN Liaison Head Hopes for Rapid Deployment

LD1202231192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2052 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Dalj, Yugoslavia, Feb 12 (TANJUG)—Colonel John Wilson, head of the U.N. liaison officers stationed in Yugoslavia, says he hopes that "the planned U.N. peace operation will be deployed soon, with both sides making an effort and refraining from the use of force".

Col. Wilson today visited the command of the Novi Sad corps of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), where he told Major-General Andrija Biorcevic that the situation on the eastern Slavonian battlefront was most difficult and might hinder the deployment of blue helmets in Yugoslavia.

Gen. Biorcevic told Col. Wilson that Croatian formations had been violating the ceasefire for the past three days along the entire eastern Slavonian front, the information service of the Novi Sad corps said. JNA units are doing everything in their power to avoid any ceasefire violations, said Gen. Biorcevic.

Col. Wilson today met with U.N. liaison officers stationed in Sid and Dalj.

Interrepublic

Serbia, Montenegro Hold 'Constructive' Talks

LD1202203492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1942 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Titograd, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—After today's talks between the leaderships of Montenegro and Serbia in Titograd, the presidents of the assemblies of the two republics, Dr. Risto Vukcevic and Aleksandar Bakocevic said tonight that considerable work was done at the meeting. According to them, principles for future relations in the new common state of Yugoslavia have been established. Both presidents of the assemblies stressed the principle of the efficiency of states and the principle of full equality of member-states and citizens.

The president of the Montenegrin Assembly, Dr. Risto Vukcevic recalled that the talks lasted almost all day. He assessed that they were constructive and principled, and displayed a lot of cooperation.

Aleksandar Bakocevic expressed his satisfaction because, as he stressed, a major task has been completed so successfully.

It is expected that a statement on today's talks in Titograd will be issued tonight.

Communique Issued

LD1302000392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2120 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Titograd, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—A meeting was held in Titograd today between the highest-ranking representatives of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. The official communique was issued late this evening. Apart from stating that today's meeting was a continuation of the talks held between the two delegations on 5 February and giving the names of those taking part, this fairly long document also enumerates principles of a common state which would be the continuation of Yugoslavia, followed by its jurisdiction and organs. The communique is almost entirely devoted to these issues, without any interpretation of the meeting itself or the talks.

The talks on the theme—officially worded as the basis for the regulating and functioning of Yugoslavia as a common state—were attended by Momir Bulatovic, Slobodan Milosevic, Branko Kostic, Borisav Jovic, Risto Vukcevic, Aleksandar Bakocevic, Milo Djukanovic, Radoman Bozovic, and members of the joint working group Zoran Zizic and Vladan Kutlesic.

The communique goes on to state:

A common state ensures the continuation of Yugoslavia and has its own state symbols (flag—the Yugoslav tricolor, anthem 'Hej Sloveni', coat of arms—to be established by a constitutional bill).

A common state and its members are republics.

The capital of a common state is Belgrade."

The principles of a common state are:

1. Equality of republics and citizens.

2. Voluntary status of each member of a common state based on the right to self-determination.

3. A joint state is open to other republics who wish to join it or become members of broader associations and communities. [as received]

4. Territorial integrity of a common state and republics.

5. Guarantees of universal rights and liberties adopted through international conventions on human rights and liberties.

6. Rule of law, distribution of power, and multiparty parliamentary democracy.

7. A unified market (independence of economic subjects, free movement of goods, labor, people, information, services, and capital).

8. The independent organization of power in republics.

According to the communique, the jurisdiction of a common state would consist of the following:

1. Human rights and liberties as concerns the equality of citizens in a common state (the protection of the rights of national and ethnic groups to be within the jurisdiction of republics).

2. Monetary, bank, foreign-exchange, and customs systems; a system of foreign economic relations; principles of tax system; functioning and development of technical and technological systems; principles of social and working legislature and principles of ecologic protection.

3. Foreign policy, international relations, international representation within the framework of the jurisdiction of a common state. (Member republics to have rights in foreign policy, international relations, and international representation within their jurisdiction.)

4. Defense of the country and security system.

Organs of a common state—as announced—will be: an assembly consisting of two councils:

—A Council of Republics consisting of an equal number of deputies, elected in each republic by the decision of the republican assembly;

—A Council of Citizens consisting of deputies elected in direct elections in republics according to the principle of one deputy for every 65,000 voters, with the proviso that there cannot be fewer than 30 deputies from any republic.

Decisions are passed by a legislative body in a majority vote in each of the councils. Jurisdiction of councils is determined in keeping with the implementation of the principle of equality of republics and citizens.

A Council of Republics decides on issues related to the equality of republics. It can discuss any issue it considers important from the point of view of the equality of republics.

A Council of Citizens decides on issues related to united interests of a common state.

Both assembly councils, with the consent of republican assemblies, decide on passing new constitutions and changes to the constitution.

A common state will be represented by a president of the republic.

A president will be elected by an assembly at the proposal of a republic, according to the established rotation of the republics.

Executive power and politics belong to the government.

A mandator is nominated by a president of the republic, while government members are nominated by a mandator. (A president of the republic and premier cannot be from the same republic.)

Both the mandator and government members are elected and dismissed by the assembly.

Constitutional court:

The constitutional court defends the constitutionality and legality of the common state.

Federal court:

The federal court executes judicial authority in the second instance in matters determined by the laws, regulations, and other acts of the common state.

The communique goes on to state that the president of the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro and the president of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia will send these bases to the constitutional commissions of the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro and National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, which, bearing in mind that the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro and the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Belgrade initiative and the bases for the organization of relations in Yugoslavia, will begin drafting a draft constitution of the common state, which will be submitted for adoption to the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro and the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and pass through further procedures.

In the course of these activities, political consultations will continue between the two delegations, this evening's communique on today's talks between the highest representatives of Montenegro and Serbia in Titograd stresses in conclusion.

Macedonia Recognizes Croatian Independence

LD1202172892 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 12 Feb 91

[Text] We have just received a report that the Croatian Foreign Ministry has received official notification from the Macedonian Foreign Ministry that at its 11 February session the Macedonian Government decided to recognize the Republic of Croatia as an autonomous and independent state. In the same note the Government of the Republic of Macedonia proposes to the Government of the Republic of Croatia that diplomatic relations should be established between the two countries at embassy level.

Macedonia Recognizes Slovenia

LD1202232292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1931 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Skopje, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—Within the framework of its constitutional authority, the government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted a decision to recognize the Republic of Slovenia as an independent and autonomous state—the Macedonian Ministry for Relations With Foreign Countries announced in Skopje tonight. The same statement says that Macedonia and Slovenia will, as expected, establish diplomatic relations at the level of embassies and sign an agreement on relations between the two countries.

The statement adds that the Macedonian Government believes that the reciprocal recognition will contribute "to the confirmation of the mutual desire to develop fruitful relations and cooperation in all fields of mutual interest."

The Macedonian Ministry for Relations With Foreign Countries adds in the same statement that the announcement of decisions of the relevant Macedonian and Croatian bodies on mutual recognition also is expected.

Slovene Assembly Recognizes Macedonia

LD1202181192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1709 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Ljubljana, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—All three chambers of the Slovene Assembly today adopted a statement on the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia as an "independent and sovereign state."

At the same time, Slovenia proposes to Macedonia the soonest possible establishment of mutual diplomatic relations at the level of embassies, and to its own government to initiate the relevant procedure in this direction. The statement also stresses that the Slovene Assembly voted for the recognition, "respecting Macedonia's positive reaction to the request of the conference on Yugoslavia to answer the question of whether it wants international recognition or not, and the fact that this republic has passed constitutional and other acts which define it as a sovereign and independent state."

Recognition Letter Sent to Gligorov

LD1202215992 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has sent a letter to Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov in which he informs Gligorov of his decision to recognize the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Among other things, the letter says: "I believe that with reciprocal international recognition we are opening a new chapter in the international relations of our two friendly nations and states. I propose that the representatives of our governments soon have talks about establishing diplomatic relations."

Serbia Intensifies Border Control With Macedonia

AU1302104492 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Interview With Sladjan Velinovic, inspector of Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Vranje, by Dragan Stojanovic near Presevo on Serbian-Macedonian border; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Stojanovic] At this point, here, near Presevo, on the border with Macedonia, adherence to the Serbian Government decree prohibiting sums of money exceeding 15,000 dinars and foreign currency being taken in and out of Serbia is being checked daily.

[Velinovic] We check the traffic on a daily basis. We do not allow foreign currency to be taken out of Serbia. The same rule applies to the goods that the Serbian Government decree prohibits being exported. The outcome of this control? Well, we have confiscated some 10,000 German marks and some 5,000 French francs. This is what it mainly boils down to.

[Stojanovic] What they are particularly trying to prevent is larger amounts of dinars being brought into Serbia from Macedonia. It has been anticipated for some time that this republic will introduce its own currency.

[Velinovic] Dinars from Serbia—we have seen some attempts to export them. However, we have had far more attempts to bring dinars into Serbia. For instance we had one person today who tried to bring some 550,000 dinars into Serbia, which we confiscated.

The shortage of essential goods—oil, sugar, meat, milk—is more and more pronounced. That is why these and similar goods are being taken out of Serbia without accompanying documents so that a lot of many can be earned on the difference in price.

Until recently a man driving an 8,000-liter tank of milk without the necessary papers could earn about 500,000 dinars on this deal alone. That is why the illegal sale and contraband is being most firmly prevented here in Presevo.

Slovene, Croatian Ministers Discuss Borders

LD1102235992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1957 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Ljubljana, 11 Feb (TANJUG)—The Slovene and Croatian ministers of internal affairs, Igor Bavcar and Ivan Vekic, met in Ljubljana today, the first time they have done so since the international independence recognition.

During the talks attention was focussed on questions of the state border, how to cross it more easily, and categorization and possible sites for the construction of joint border facilities. At the same time they brought up the question of joint action to stop illegal border crossings. The ministers also came to an arrangement on cooperation in the area of crime and information technology.

At the end of the talks the ministers presented each other with ministries of internal affairs' certificates for good cooperation in the struggle for the independence of the two countries. The Croatian ministry appointed Igor Bavcar an honorary member of the Croatian police.

Croatian Navy Base To Be Located in Savudrija

AU1102185392 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 3 Feb 92 p 2

[B. S. report: "The Croatian Navy Base in Savudrija"]

[Text] Savudrija, 2 February—At the last session of the Buje Communal Assembly, Lucijan Benolic, president of the Buje commune, briefed the communal councillors about the intention of the Croatian Navy to place one of its military units on the Savudrija Peninsula. We can speculate that the navy base will be placed on the same spot that was, until recently, held by the Yugoslav Navy unit (surveillance, radar base). The setup of the Croatian Navy unit will be financially assisted by Buje Commune. The plan will be realized gradually, but according to La Voce Del Popolo, this is an unavoidable task considering the strategic position and the proximity of the border.

President of Buje Commune also informed the deputies about the systematic call-up of all military conscripts into the 145th Brigade. After taking an oath, the conscripts will go through an eight-day military training course.

Sava River Bridge Opens Croatian-Bosnian Link

LD1202220292 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] By the latest decision of the Crisis Committee of the Slavonski Brod municipality, a bridge over the Sava River has been reopened for pedestrians between 0630 [0530 GMT] and 2000 [1900 GMT]. People crossing into neighboring Bosnia-Hercegovina must carry their identity cards and military reservists permission to leave their residence issued by relevant crisis committees.

After a bridge over the Sava near Bosanski Samac was mined—until recently the only land link between Croatian and Bosnia- Hercegovina—all traffic between the two republics was halted. A ferry near Bosanski Samac is carrying passengers between 0800 [0700 GMT] to 1700, and personal cars can be put on a ferry for Zupanja and Svilaj between 0500 and 1700.

Federal

Army Leaves Islands Without Taking Mines

AU1202194192 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 92 p 4

[I. P. report: " The JNA Is Leaving Vis and Lastovo"]

[Text] Split—Although the departure of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army [JNA] from the Islands of Vis and Lastovo is more and more noticeable, the Lastovo Crisis Headquarters is not satisfied with the negotiations that were held on this matter between the Croatian Government representative and a JNA delegation on Vis, few days ago. The people from Lastovo are of the opinion that because the exact date and manner of the Army's withdrawal from these two islands has not been agreed upon, the JNA has been withdrawing from these regions unsupervised, taking along whatever it wants and disregarding that this is the territory of the Croatian state.

The Crisis Headquarters has announced that the Army's departure must not be permitted before the parts of the islands where mines were laid are de-mined, as things could have a tragic outcome without the cooperation of those who planted the mines in the first place. There are also more concrete, economic grounds, for the discontent, as the military installations and officers' families owe some 500,000 dinars to the "Komunalac" company, claiming they cannot settle the debts because they do not have any Croatian dinars.

At the same time, the Army continues to pack its things on Vis and Lastovo. The "Czech villa" at the very entrance into the Vis harbor has also been evacuated. The underwater mines that were laid in the Vis harbor were stored on the transport ships that sailed in the direction of Boka harbor.

Brankovic Criticizes Babic 'Trust Territory' Idea

LD1202204992 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1738 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 12 (TANJUG)—The demand by president of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) Milan Babic for Krajina to become a trust territory of the U.N. is unrealistic, high official at the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat Branko Brankovic told TANJUG today.

Brankovic said that on the basis of article 78 of the U.N. charter and current practice the trusteeship system advocated by Babic "is impossible to implement, and also unnecessary." Brankovic, head of the secretariat's

department for international organizations, said that the trusteeship system could not be applied on territories of U.N. member countries and that most U.N. trust territories thus far were former colonies.

U.N. trusteeship of the Serb Krajinas is unnecessary as the U.N.'s peace plan calls for the territories to be under U.N. protection, Brankovic said.

He recalled that U.N. Under Secretary General Marrack Goulding had explained that the deployment of a peacekeeping force would not prejudice a political resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and that the troops would remain in the territories encompassed by the plan until a final solution was found to the Yugoslav crisis.

Babic rejected the U.N. plan, demanding alterations. The RSK parliament three days ago accepted it unconditionally.

Babic said the declaration of the RSK a U.N. trust territory would confirm that it was no longer a part of Croatia.

Serbs in Croatia in areas where they are the majority population proclaimed the RSK in response to Croatia's secession and their degradation by Croatia from a nation to a national minority.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

President Izetbegovic Receives Turkish Envoy

LD1202055992 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1835 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Sarajevo, February 11 (TANJUG)—Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic today received Turkish Ambassador Berhan Ekinci, who is on a working visit to this Yugoslav republic. Ekinci was also received by republican Vice-Premier Muhamed Cengic. Ekinci presented to Izetbegovic a message from Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel on the recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Turkey. Izetbegovic and Ekinci exchanged opinions on future cooperation between the two republics, the opening of representative offices, and the establishment of regular diplomatic relations.

Referendum Preparations Continue Despite Protests

LD1102214592 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1958 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 11 (TANJUG)—Preparations for a referendum in Bosnia-Hercegovina on the future state and legal status of the republic, which has been called for February 29 and March 1, are going ahead according to plan, despite opposition in individual municipalities, the press was told in the republican capital of Sarajevo today.

President of the central republican polling commission Mirko Boskovic today said that ballot papers for the referendum were being printed and that the question of them was: "Are you for a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Hercegovina, a state of equal citizens—peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina—Moslems, Serbs, Croats and others living in it."

A certain number of polling commissions are, however, not making preparations for the referendum, Boskovic said. He said that eleven municipal commissions had refused to make any preparations whatever and nineteen had not responded in any way.

Capljina, which has a predominantly Croat population, is committed to the referendum, Boskovic said, but expects the question on the ballot paper to be the one formulated recently by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), namely, "Are you for a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Hercegovina, a state community of the constitutive and sovereign nations—Croatian, Moslem and Serbian—in their ethnic regions. (cantons)."

Despite disagreement among the three ruling national parties—the Moslem SDA [Party of Democratic Action] the Serb [word indistinct] the Croat HDZ—on the question that should be asked, the republican commission has gone ahead with the printing of the ballots.

The council of the Serbian Democratic Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina (SDS BIH) issued a statement in connection with the referendum to the effect that the calling of a general popular referendum in the republic is an impermissible political manipulation.

The referendum must be regarded exclusively as a plebiscite [word indistinct] the Croat and Moslem national communities, all the more so in view of the fact that the Serbian nation has already held a plebiscite on its status, the SDS BIH council says in its statement.

The Serbs will not vote in the referendum, they will not take part in its organzation, nor will its results be binding on the Serb population of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the statement stresses. The council further recalls that the Serbian nation financed its plebiscite from its own funds and therefore considers the financing of the present referendum from the republican [word indistinct] impermissible and detrimental to the Serbian nation, the SDS-BIM council emphasizes in conclusion.

Radio, Television Threaten General Strike

AU1102090692 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] At today's meeting, the Editorial Board of the Information-Political Program of Sarajevo Television examined the material situation of Sarajevo Television employees and supported the stands of the Editorial Board of the Current Information Program of Sarajevo Radio and, in connection with this, adopted the following conclusions:

We demand that the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government urgently create the conditions to bring about the observation of the legal obligation to pay the television license fee.

We demand that the authorized organs return all the property of the public company Sarajevo Radio and Television—transmitters, relay stations, and so on.

We demand that the Sarajevo Radio and Television management secure salaries that are 100 percent higher than January wage levels. If the Sarajevo Radio and Television management is not able to meet this demand, we demand that our founder—the Bosnia- Hercegovina Assembly—does this within the limits of its authority.

The conclusion of the Information-Political Program of Sarajevo Television is that serious mistakes have been made in management and in the management of the financial and business operations of Sarajevo Radio and Television, which are the direct responsibility of its top cadres.

Regarding the resignation offered by the collegium of Sarajevo Radio and Television directors, the Editorial Board of the Information-Political Program of the Sarajevo Television does not accept it. The stand prevailed that personal responsibility for the generally bleak situation is being avoided. If the above-mentioned demands are not met promptly, the Editorial Board of the Information-Political Program of Sarajevo Television will start a general strike together with all employees of Sarajevo Radio and Television.

The Editorial Board of the Information-Political Program of Sarajevo Television chooses to remain unified and independent. These stands were supported by the workers in Mobile Production, Program Realization, Studio Editing and Reproduction, Scene Realization and Development, and the Sarajevo Television Maintenance, at a joint meeting today.

Bosnian Paramilitary Readiness Detailed

92BA0469A Sarajevo NEDJELJA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jan 92 pp 11-12

[Article by Mensur Camo: "Defenseless Future"]

[Text] "Kadijevic realized that events could no longer be controlled, and this probably took him to the breaking point. The fact that Blagoje Adzic was temporarily named to his post is also a natural reflex, because military autarchy is associated with him." This was recently stated by Dr. Petar Deak, the director of Center for Security and Defense Studies in Budapest, thus confirming the fact that international military strategy institutions, and not only domestic analysts (as well as those who—to their misfortune—have direct experience in the matter), are successfully recognizing the overall situation of chaos, anarchy, and entropy of that segment of Yugoslav society over which there is almost complete control in all regular states: the "bearers" of arms and of the right to use them. Thus, despite everything, the decision by the last Yugoslav minister of "means of mass murder" to resign is not a political decision, as it is largely viewed by the domestic public, but rather the bitter, purely clannish assessment by an army general that his orders are no longer obeyed and carried out even by a semi-intoxicated sergeant major in the most far-flung bramble.

According to some rather modest estimates, between 150,000 and 200,000 people are involved in direct wartime activities on the soil of (the former) Yugoslavia, while up to a million people are armed with all sorts of weaponry, from light infantry to heavy artillery, on "standby" status. Thus, if the minister of the army is already illegal, then who is commanding this powerful and frightening army, which is six times the size of the prewar effective strength of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]?

Strongest Yugoslav Paramilitary

Quite simply, there is no single commander and single command, even on the individual warring sides. This probably undermines the most important principle of military activity—subordination—the result being dozens, and perhaps even hundreds of mutually belligerent armies, in which the aforementioned sergeant major, who has driven away his minister, makes decisions autonomously, in accordance with the amount of alcohol that he has drunk or, in the best case, in agreement with local opstina representatives or the second lieutenant from his unit. Thus, lingering behind Kadijevic's decision to turn over the marshal's baton of the JNA to the completely Serbianized JNA General Staff is the assessment—and it is not advisable to question its complete competence—that Yugoslavia is teeming with armed groups, popularly called paramilitary groups, and that one of them—for now the strongest one—is clearly the Yugoslav People's Army. That is the real situation, which presumably requires no further proof, and which has been created by numerous inexplicable and illegal decisions by the JNA leadership. For example, the one about mobilizing volunteers: Volunteer armies are neither disciplined nor willing to carry out orders and engage in actions that are not in accordance with the "psychological motives" of their soldiers. In principle, this is something that will send chills down the spine of any officer or statesman-legalist.

Since the let-up of war activities in Croatia, sometime around the fall of Vukovar, all eyes have been slowly turning to Bosnia, and even more so to Hercegovina. Incidents are multiplying: Visegrad, the upper Drina basin, Mostar, Neum, the Sava basin. In B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina], the view that until recently was discussed under one's breath is finally irrevocably defined: that the JNA is in collusion with militant groups from both, or rather from all three, sides. Its arming of members of the Serbian ethnic enclave in B-H and close cooperation with neo-Chetnik groups are generally known facts, but

the "handwriting" of the KOS [Yugoslav Counterintelligence Service] is also clearly discernible within certain Croatian, and even Muslim, armed groups. In this way, the JNA too confirms for its part that extending the war to Bosnia, and even escalating it, is only in the interest of the paramilitary groups, but not of the citizens, nor the economy, nor the state, nor even the militant politicians, who have realized with panic that the well-armed formations are not even under the Lord's control any more, much less their control. Dr. Deak from the Center in Budapest also levels charges against the JNA in this regard: "Part of the military lobby does not want peace. It is because of this that manipulative information is appearing, and it is not impossible that the Yugoslav military intelligence service is supplying the state organs with this sort of material." The crowning proof is the "Spegelj-gate" affair: For months the JNA knew about the arming of Croatia, but it did not even try to prevent it.

It is only if one does not consider the preceding (hypo-) thesis that the "unusual" congruity of military and "HOS [Croatian Defense Force]" sources about the military strength of western Hercegovina comes as a surprise: Specifically, both sides contend that as many as 16,000 people are respectably armed. Indeed, "malicious people" do not see a significant difference between the two "military services" that are perhaps the strongest in present-day Yugoslavia—the KOS and HOS. Just a difference of two letters.

Paramilitary Groups in B-H

If one ignores the numerous local, rural, and similar militias, which are organized according to the principle of civil defense, then the most significant paramilitary formations in B-H today bear the prefix of the most numerous ethnic groups. They were formed in close cooperation with political and military factors of the national parties, although it must be noted that in the case of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], the formation of paramilitary groups is a by-product of the process of ethnic amalgamation of "their" nations, or rather a consequence of objective events and encirclement, while with the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] the armed factor was one of the focal points of general party policy from the outset. To oversimplify, Izetbegovic and Kljuic will rightly be able to articulate their responsibility for the activities of "Muslim" and "Croatian" paramilitary groups in the concrete names of militant Muslims and Croats who are "renegades" in their mother parties or who have never even been members of them; Karadzic will not be able to do this, because it was part of his program to be the most prominent Serbian "warrior."

1. Serbian Formations

These are filled with territorial defense troops, based on the principle of the "armed nation," of diverse ideological provenance (Chetniks, "Arkanists," volunteers from the Croatian front, ethnic militias, JNA "deserters"). A recent YUTEL report from Ozren clearly described the terror wielded by an armed group led by republican parliamentary deputy Miladin Nedic over several hundred people—all indications are that this involves the latest wave of refugees from Papuk, about whom Milosevic ordered that they be kept in B-H at any price and that they not be allowed to make it to Belgrade.

There is a disturbing report that NEDJELJA is hereby publishing as an exclusive: In recent days, Radovan Karadzic has sent several groups of Serbian youth to Pancevo for specialist training. What kind of work is intended for these specialists once they return to B-H before long? This is probably known only to Karadzic and Blagoje Adzic, who set up this arrangement.

2. Croatian Formations

Although both the JNA and the HOS agree about the figure of 16,000 well-armed western Hercegovians, that information is probably not accurate, although there are certainly thousands of Croats armed with automatic infantry weapons, Stinger rocket launchers, and even heavy artillery equipment. These groups are filled by the local population, but also by veterans from Croatia, as well as "dogs of war"—worldly mercenaries, such as Blaz Kraljevic-Ero, a man who is depicted as the commander of western Hercegovian defense, and who spent several decades as a military instructor in Australia.

Information coming from military circles in the Banja Luka corps about 1,500 armed Croats in the Sava basin is accurate, something that is not concealed even by the local HDZ leadership, but here, as in other B-H locales, this relates primarily to territorial militias, and not to organized military units.

3. Muslim Formations

Information about the "HOS" units of Alija Siljak in eastern Bosnia, as an "outpost on the Drina" for the independent Croatian state is not convincing, eveb though a great deal of money and many liters of printer's ink have been spent on them. In addition, SLOBODNA BOSNA recently published an interview with the professed commander of the "Bosnian Liberation Army." According to what is known, this is one of the numerous Muslim JNA officers who deserted and offered their "good services" to an unidentified "employer." As in the previous cases, the Muslims too are well-armed and organized on the level of local militias, but for now there are not even the rudimentary beginnings of any sort of regular army. Although this is something that could probably change over night, under pressure from potential aggression.

Goals

The military goal of the Serbian formations is to implement the political program of the SDS, that of the Croatian formations is to implement the program of Paraga's HSP [Croatian Rights Party], while that of the Muslim formations—which is paradoxical only at first

glance—is to implement the program of the communist regime before the elections held year before last: defending the B-H of AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia], or of ZAVNOBIH [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Bosnia-Hercegovina], to be more precise.

Activities

Thus far, this large number of soldiers has not had very much to do. Besides "control" over local transportation and "security" in their area, a large share of them have taken part in the Croatian war as well. According to one statement by the deputy minister of the B-H MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Vitomir Zeplaic, which was recently provided to this reporter, between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants of B-H have fought on either side in Croatia.

Besides armed activity—and because there are not yet any open military confrontations in B-H, this is usually reduced to threats and saber-rattling—the paramilitary groups are also involved in "collecting money," as the Americans would say: black marketeering and the sale of weapons, old Yugoslav currency, drugs (lately, an unprecedented quantity of heroin has turned up on the Sarajevo drug market), and other goods in heavy demand (petroleum, food, gold). Naturally, the cream of the crop from these high-profit transactions is not bought by all the members of the paramilitary groups, but rather only their leaders, who have obviously already reserved visas for states in which they will be able to spend the provisions accumulated over all these months. That would clearly be a wise move for them.

Arms

Some analysts are bandying about estimates that there are currently 200,000 to 300,000 "firearms" in B-H. According to well-known information, the fire power of all the groups is approximately equal, although the Croats—and to a lesser extent the Muslims—have a greater variety of types and calibers. For the most part, they all have the Yugoslav version of the Kalashnikov and heavy weaponry from the same family, and thus Zolja, Osa, and Stinger rocket launchers, mortars of all calibers—where the Serbian side excels, because its supplier was the JNA—and unidentified but clearly large quantities of hand grenades and other explosives. Only the Serbian side and part of the western Hercegovian side have heavy artillery. Only the JNA has armored equipment and aircraft.

Everyone has the means to block and obstruct transportation, by mere virtue of the fact that such resources are handy and adaptable. According to some information, however, preparations have also been made for a completely "qualified" severing of communication—through the destruction of levees, bridges, channels, tunnels, etc.—which is usually carried out only by a "serious" army. The reason for this is that the designers, construction foremen, and leading contractors who built these structures are in turn citizens of B-H, meaning people who, in principle, can be motivated to make their professional know-how and experience available to "defense" or "attack" forces, accompanied by appropriate political-ethnically mobilized screaming and shouting.

Will all these powerful paramilitary groups succeed in provoking war in B-H based on the Chekhovian principle of the gun that must be fired in the third act? The crisis centers where the fuse of all-out war could be lit are already familiar: the Neretva Valley, eastern Bosnia, the upper Drina basin, the Sava basin, the Kupreska plateau, and the thus far surprisingly calm Cazinska Krajina. But if this reporter may be allowed to prognosticate, the type of war that has befallen Croatia will probably bypass B-H. Simply because, including the JNA, there is no longer any armed formation that could undertake aggression in terms of width and depth. Not even the JNA is capable of this any longer. Moreover, it has exhausted the funds with which it financed the previous course of the war.

But what about all these weapons? There are few of the current paramilitary soldiers who will agree to return weapons that have already been acquired or bought, regardless of a political solution to the current Yugoslav crisis. Thus, even if there is no all-out war—and we repeat: there probably will not be one—our future will scarcely be a happy one, because peace will be disturbed by occasional local skirmishes like the ones occurring today and by a powerful wave of individual terrorism, which police experts expect "after all this has passed us by."

Thus, we do not overstate our optimism; even today's situation could seem like the garden of Eden to us some day.

Croatia

Tudjman Denies German Aircraft Delivery

LD1202221492 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Interview with Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia. by Miolvan Sibl, director of HINA, place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The first question: Mr. President, some foreign newspapers and agencies, Britain's THE GUARDIAN and others, have reported that Germany would deliver MIG-21 aircraft to the Croatian Army and that Croatian pilots have been training on these planes belonging to the former East German arsenal.

The reply of the president of the republic: It is purely arbitrary, i.e. it is not true that Germany is delivering, or that it expressed readiness to deliver any kind of military aircraft to Croatia. Allegations by THE GUARDIAN

and some other foreign newspapers and agencies that Germany is delivering arms of any kind from possible military reserves of former East Germany, or that it is training Croatian military cadres, are completely arbitrary and untrue. No such talks were ever held between the two countries.

The second question: Rumors have been spreading in foreign countries that Croatia is preparing offensive operations in temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia.

The reply of the president of the republic: It is also not true that the Croatian Army is preparing offensive operations for the liberation of the areas temporarily occupied by the former Yugoslav People's Army and terrorist groups. Croatia has accepted and is awaiting the arrival of peacekeeping forces, i.e. it would like to see this problem resolved in a peaceful way. In this connection I issued instructions for the demobilization of 20,000 Croatian soldiers, which will be carried out as soon as the peacekeeping forces arrive in Croatia. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, said this in his replies to HINA.

Tudjman Receives U.S. Congressman Sensenbrenner

LD1202180192 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] In Zagreb today Croatian President Franjo Tudjman received a U.S. congressional delegation led by Republican Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, a member of the House Judiciary Committee. He told President Tudjman that support in the U.S. Congress for international recognition of Croatia is growing. The final decision, however, is made by President Bush on the recommendation of the State Department.

He stressed that Croatia has many friends in the Congress working for its recognition and also for aiding Croatian reconstruction after the war ends. President Tudjman expressed his satisfaction with the U.S. stance that borders cannot be changed by force, reiterating that Croatia has been working since the start of the conflict for the arrival of peacekeeping forces and the conclusion of a peace conference. He noted that Croatia maintains this position. He stressed that Croatia wanted to model herself after U.S. democracy. U.S. policy, however, must accept the fact that Yugoslavia no longer exists and establish bilateral relations with the new states.

Statement Issued on UN Resolution 740

LD1102160992 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] The Government of the Republic of Croatia, at its sessions of 9 and 11 February, considered UN Security Council Resolution 740, adopted on 7 February, and came to the following conclusions:

The Government of the Republic of Croatia notes with pleasure that Resolution 740 has totally rejected the unfounded accusations that Croatian authorities are acting as an obstacle to the UN peace mediation. The Republic of Croatia accepts the deployment of UN peace forces as one of the ways of guaranteeing peace and security on the temporarily occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia.

Second, the Government of the Republic of Croatia welcomes the UN Security Council's determination to resolve other problems surrounding the dispatch and deployment of the peace forces. The government wishes to note that the Republic of Serbia and the Yugoslav Army have assumed those obligations explicitly outlined in Point 21 of the UN secretary general's report of 6 January 1992, further endorsed by Resolution 727 of 8 January. The Republic of Serbia and the Yugoslav Army have pledged to force the leaders of the outlaw section of the Serbian population in the Republic of Croatia to accept the UN peace actions. In line with this, the Government of the Republic of Croatia demands that the Republic of Serbia and the Yugoslav Army be asked unconditionally to fulfill their obligations.

Third, the Government of the Republic of Croatia expects the United Nations, the Security Council, and the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia in their future peace mediations to respect current realities, i.e. international recognition of the Republic of Croatia and other republics of the former Yugoslavia. As a result, the Government of the Republic of Croatia asks all the participants to fully respect Conclusion 3 of the peace conference arbitration commission under which the borders of the Republic of Croatia, as drawn up after World War II according to international law, are to be treated as state borders.

Fourth, the Government of the Republic of Croatia maintains that, following international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the task of the peace conference chaired by Lord Carrington is to establish, in light of Conclusion 1 of the arbitration commission and the international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, that Yugoslavia no longer exists as a full-fledged entity in international law. This fact obliges the peace conference to resolve the issue of inheritance as quickly as possible.

Fifth, the Government of the Republic of Croatia proposes that the peace operation be put into motion immediately so that the peacekeeping forces can be dispatched as soon as possible to the temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia.

Sixth, the Government of the Republic of Croatia will not take on any obligations outside the framework established by the peace operation plan, although other parties are trying to impose them on Croatia through various interpretations of the plan and certain decrees in it.

Seventh, at a session on 8 January the Government of the Republic of Croatia formed a government working

group to monitor UN peace operations. The group includes Dr. Milan Ramljak, the president of the working group; Bozidar Gagro from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Imra Agotic and Petar Cavlovic from the Ministry of Defense; Josko Moric from the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Vladimir Sakic from the Ministry of Justice and Administration; Zlatko Gledec from the Ministry of Trade; and Damir Zoric from the Office for Refugees and Displaced Persons.

Eighth, the Government of the Republic of Croatia directed the Ministry of Justice and Administration to draft a proposal for the next government session on how the government office for the UN peace operation will be formed, the statement of the Government of the Republic of Croatia on UN Security Council Resolution 740 says in conclusion.

The Croatian Government charged the Ministry of Justice and Administration with drafting a proposal, for its next session, on the formation of a government office for the UN peace operation.

Among other items on the agenda of the session held on Tuesday was the government's decision to send a proposal to the Assembly to recognize the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent state with its current borders. This recognition would take effect simultaneously with the decision of the Republic of Slovenia. The decision to open an embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Ljubljana was adopted.

With certain remarks, the government adopted the draft proposal on passing a law on the election of members to municipal assemblies and counties in the Republic of Croatia. The government had earlier adopted a proposal on passing a law on local self-government and sent it for Assembly procedures.

The government favorably assessed the initiative for the rectification of the historical injustice done to Dr. Alojzije Stepinac through a staged political process. The government is therefore proposing to the Assembly to condemn in a declaration the anti-Croatian policy which caused this and similar charges and, in cooperation with judicial bodies, to take measures and initiate procedures to rehabilitate the innocently sentenced.

The Croatian Government favorably assessed the initiative to pass a constitutional law on changes and amendments to the law on the constitutional court of the Republic of Croatia.

The government was informed about the proposal to pass standing orders for the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia and discussed in particular the decrees which regulate relations between the government and the Assembly.

The government adopted the initiative on passing the law on protection from illegal actions which was sent by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. The proposal was adopted through which this legal act will be adopted in an emergency procedure, due to the importance of the issue regulated by the envisaged law.

The government was informed about the proposed agenda of the joint and collective session of all the Assembly chambers convened on 13 and 14 February and verified answers to certain questions from deputies. During the debate on the government's statement on UN Security Council Resolution 740, [Minister Without Portfolio] Drazen Budisa resigned from his post in the government.

Mesic: UN's Goulding 'Overstepping His Authority'

LD1202135792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1110 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Zagreb, February 12 (TANJUG)—Member of the innermost leadership of the ruling party—Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)—in the Yugoslav secessionist Republic of Croatia Stjepan Mesic accused Marrack Goulding, U.N. under secretary general, of "overstepping his authority" because he held talks with President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Milan Babic during his recent visit to Yugoslavia.

In a statement for the Zagreb daily "VECERNJI LIST", former Yugoslav Presidency President Mesic stated the hope that Goulding had not promised to Babic that laws of Croatia would not be applied on the territory of Krajina so as to win him over for the arrival of helmets".

Babic is president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), which Serbs proclaimed on the territory of Croatia in the region where they make up the majority population. They did this in response to Croatia's secession, making use also for the Serbs—as one of the two constitutent nations in Croatia until President Franjo Tudjman degraded them to minority status—the right to self-determination.

Mesic again threatened Serbs that Croatia, as he said, "would not not permit at any cost on any of its parts the application of legislation of some other country." According to Mesic's "interpretation" of Vance's plan, the international peace troops were to "enable establishing a rule of law on the entire Croatian territory."

Mesic was not the only Croatian leader who expects of the peace troops to help in establishing Croatian authority in the territories that are to be under U.N. protection and added that "if these territories are not returned with the help of the U.N. forces, then this would be done by force of arms."

Such a statement was repeated on Croatian Television also by Croatian President Tudjman although only two days previously he promised he "accepts Vance's plan to the full."

Minister Budisa Submits Resignation

LD1102144992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1402 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Zagreb, 11 Feb (TANJUG)—Drazen Budisa, minister without portfolio in the government of the Republic of Croatia, has tendered his resignation. Croatian Assembly President Vladimir Seks revealed this at today's regular news conference in the assembly. Asked whether the government is disunited, Seks said "the resignation of one minister cannot be taken as a sign of disunity in the government." The reason for Budisa's resignation was not revealed. It has been learned from well informed assembly sources that additional changes in important ministries are imminent.

Gives Reasons for Resignation

LD1202172492 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Minister in the Croatian Government Drazen Budisa today sent to the president and members of the government of the Republic of Croatia an explanation of why he had resigned. In his letter, carried by HINA, Budisa says:

As you know on several occasions at government's sessions I stressed that I considered it unacceptable that the government should be reduced to the kind of political body which is there merely to rubber stamp decisions made elsewhere or to alleviate the consequences of wrongful moves which it never made or took no part in initiating. I am not implying that the role of the government of democratic unity has been degraded to this level. On the contrary, this government has achieved valuable results despite very difficult circumstances it has been working in. However, the fact is that decisions of key importance for Croatia's fate have not been made by the government but the government has always been asked for its approval of these decisions. I refer here also to, the acceptance by Croatia of all demands put before her in the context of the EC conference on former Yugoslavia and the resolution of the crisis there and to the acceptance of the conditions dictated to us within the context of the UN involvement in establishing and monitoring peace in Croatia.

In his letter to Cyrus Vance of 6 January, Budisa says, the President of the Republic fully and unconditionally accepted the concept and the plan of the UN secretary general. This implies that in the areas under UN protection laws and institutions of the Republic of Croatia will not apply in the interim period or until a political solution is found.

I see Croatia's main national problem in the hundreds of thousand of displaced persons. It is totally unrealistic to expect that these peopie will be able to or will want to return to the occupied areas which will continue to be under the control of current police and civilian authorities in so-called Krajinas where so-called Krajina laws or the legal system of so-called rump Yugoslavia will be in force. This is the main reason why I maintain that the document entitled "The UN Plan of 4 February 1992" should not have been agreed upon. It is my firm belief that the plan will prevent the displaced persons from a large part of Croatia from returning to their homes.

Since the government had no say in these decisions it was wrong to ask us to air our views about them. As far as I am concerned, insistence on the government of the Republic of Croatia taking stands on the latest UN documents is an attempt to divulge the responsibility for an eventual negative development of the political situation in the future to those who, objectively speaking, are not responsible for the present situation. I cannot share this responsibility and that is the main reason why I am resigning from the government, Drazen Budisa says, in the explanation of his resignation from the Croatian government.

Assembly Officials Comment on Budisa

AU1102162492 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Nino Kosutic report]

[Text] Dr. Vladimir Seks, vice president of the Croatian Assembly, unofficially confirmed that the likely cause of [Information] Minister Drazen Budisa's resignation was his displeasure with Croatia's position after President Tudjman's unconditional acceptance of the so-called Cyrus Vance plan on deploying peacekeeping troops.

According to this plan, Croatian laws will be suspended temporarily in the occupied territories where the UN forces will be deployed. The government representatives pointed out several times that such a solution is not acceptable for Croatia, but Tudjman, as it seems, nevertheless finally agreed to it.

Dr. Zarko Domljan, Croatian Assembly president, said at the Assembly news conference that the details of the Vance peace plan have not been announced yet.

The government held a closed session today. The other important change in the government will probably be the replacement of Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic. Reliable sources have learned that he has been offered an ambassadorial post, but this has not been confirmed.

The Croatian Assembly representatives reported that in two days they will consider some electoral laws, a law on local self-government, and probably discuss the UN deployment. The new procedural rules will result in great changes in the powers of the Assembly.

In answering a reporter's question, Domljan confirmed the rumors that some Serbian deputies will return to the Assembly. He said that this is their lawful right unless criminal charges have been brought against them. The procedure for annulling deputy immunity has not been implemented.

Admiral Letica Threatens 'Military Force'

LD1202145792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1256 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 12 (TANJUG)—Navy commander of the secessionist Yugoslav republic of Croatia, Admiral Sveto Letica has said that the war in Croatia is not over yet because a part of the Croatian territory is still under occupation, as he specified.

Admiral Letica told a news conference in the Adriatic port city of Split yesterday, as the Belgrade daily BORBA writes today, that "if the political option does not produce the expected results soon, Croatia will liberate its territory by military force."

The Croatian authorities view the Republic of Serbian Krajina as "occupied territory." The Republic of Serbian Krajina is to be placed under the protection of U.N. Peace-keeping forces under a plan of special U.N. envoy Cyrus Vance.

Admiral Letica spoke about the unlawful occupation and plundering of flats of Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) personnel in Dalmatia, which were vacated when the JNA withdrew. He, however, failed to say anything about the flats left by civilians of Serbian nationality who have fled Croatia out of fear of a new genocide.

Head of the Split building industry service Ante Njegovan told the same news conference, as BORBA writes, that "between 700 and 900 military flats have unlawfully been moved into" "mostly by members of the Croatian police and National Guard Corps."

Krajina's Paspalj Says Referendum Unneccessary

AU1102215292 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Interview with Mile Paspalj, president of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, by Jasmina Milivojevic; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] After the legitimate decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Glina, Milan Babic scheduled and held his own kind of assembly. He experimented with the creation of new communes, even split up entire existing ones, and proclaimed deputies without elections. Despite that, the Assembly session in Knin did not have a quorum. Babic thus turned the most serious question, the question of war or peace, into a farce which we hope will have no serious consequences.

[Milivojevic] Mr. Paspalj, how do you see the session of the Knin Assembly?

[Paspalj] You know that the session held on 9 February in Glina was legally convened with the signatures of one-third of the deputies. We heard that the government was scheduling its own kind of assembly in Knin, but the deputies or delegates who had been at the Glina session had on that occasion endorsed the decision about accepting the Vance plan. They endorsed positions agreeing that the SFRY Presidency had acted legally on behalf of the Krajina. In earlier conflicts or talks, individuals representing the Republic of Serbian Krajina had certainly not accepted the position of the SFRY Presidency.

The Knin Assembly was made up of six local communities, most probably in order to extend someone's power or pain. I see no other reason, because if we need to create a larger assembly or increase the number of deputies in this one, we need to join together, according to a decision and the will of the Great Assembly of Baranja, Slavonia, and Srem and of western Slavonia, where they have asked to join the Republic of Serbian Krajina. This is that entire assembly.

I think that the invention of some new communes and some new local communities for the promotion of personal interests is not a good thing.

[Milivojevic] Can the decisions of the Knin Assembly be legal and legitimate considering everything that you have just said?

[Paspalj] If we work according to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and if we work according to the rules of procedure and the paragraphs which relate to the Assembly, there were not enough delegates at that session, even with those communes that had been invented. This is because the Constitution says that an Assembly session needs a two-thirds majority to make legal decisions. Two-thirds is 74 out of 112. At (?yesterday's) session they somehow had 65 deputies, according to the information that I have. That means that there was not two-thirds. All the decisions that they made were illegal and illegitimate. The representatives who sat there as representatives of some kind of private communes were illegal.

[Milivojevic] The referendum asking whether voters favor Vance's plan, either with the objections or in its entirety, is obviously nothing but farce, deceptive, and not to mention fraudulent, because the UN peace plan has been accepted by all interested parties and no other objections can be discussed. Why then does Milan Babic need a referendum?

[Paspalj] Look, a referendum in any state and in any country is a very serious matter. I think there is a desire to make use of this referendum only as a way of extending personal ambitions and personal power.

I think that there is no need for a referendum if we are in favor of a struggle in the interests of the Serbian people. If this question were to be resolved.... [changes thought] On the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina we clearly expressed unity with the Serbian people in previous ways through an association of communes, through the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, and later through the Republic of Serbian Krajina. That means that, in my opinion, a referendum should be scheduled as to whether this Serbian people that we want

to [word indistinct] wants this Vance plan or not. The destiny of the Serbian people should not be decided by one group of 250-300,000 residents.

In my opinion, there is no justification for the referendum. Decisions are made on these kinds of things by political forums which understand the seriousness of the situation and make the kind of decisions that the people need.

[Milivojevic] Will the referendum be held on 22 and 23 February then?

[Paspalj] Most probably. If we find some more communes then the referendum will be held there, but those communes which agreed to the peace plan....[changes thought] I am telling you that I had representatives and deputies in the Assembly from all the communes on the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. I even had three deputies from Knin in this Assembly and they all accepted Vance's plan, except for six who abstained. That means that there is no need to hold a referendum if these really are legitimate representatives of their people. I think they are because they were chosen by the assemblies of all these communes.

Krajina Defense Minister Explains Resignation

AU1102215892 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Because of his disagreement over the way in which the politics of Milan Babic [president of Krajina government] has been created and conducted, Milan Tarbuk, defense minister in the government of Serbian Krajina, has submitted his irrevocable resignation to Mile Paspalj, president of the assembly of the republic of Serbian Krajina.

In an interview with our reporter, Tarbuk reveals for the first time his reasons for his resignation:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] Mr. Tarbuk, what are the basic reasons?

[Tarbuk] One of the fundamental reasons is the discrepancy between the policy of the republic of Serbian Krajina and the policy of the Republic of Serbia and the SFRY Presidency, which meant that the basic conditions for the concept of the defense of the republic of Serbian Krajina did not exist. When I became a member of the government of Serbian Krajina, I believed that the defense system of our republic would be compatible with the system of the Republic of Serbia, that is to say, compatible with the system of the Yugoslav armed forces.

Bearing in mind the fact that Milan Babic, as well as some people in the government who support him, distanced the policy of Serbian Krajina from that of Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia with their actions in the implementation and creation of Krajina's politics, there were insufficient conditions for the implementation of such a defense system. I, as well as my colleagues, were of the opinion that we in Krajina must lean on the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia, because without them we could not wage a war against Croatia.

[Reporter] Were there any differences between you and Babic regarding Cyrus Vance's plan?

[Tarbuk] I must be honest. I was in the SFRY Presidency twice when Cyrus Vance's plan was discussed, and at that time I was not absolutely convinced that such a plan could be effective. However, after subsequent statements, especially by Mr. Kostic [vice-president of the SFRY Assembly], and General Hadzic [name as heard], I realized that this is the only way out at the moment.

I think that we, the Serbs in Krajina, have through our struggle established our borders and set up a system of government. We are strongly backed by the Yugoslav People's Army; we are supported by the UN; we have guarantees from the SFRY Presidency—and I believe that the people who are currently in the SFRY Presidency and in the Army leadership are honest and responsible and, I am sure, know what they are doing—we also have the support of the Republic of Serbia. I believe that we have isolated ourselves by rejecting such guarantees, and this type of isolation could be fatal for the Serbs in the republic of Serbian Krajina.

In accordance with the latest decision passed by the assembly of the republic of Serbian Krajina in Glina, I think that sufficient guarantees have been offered by Krajina people and the leadership in the communes, for the blue helmets to be successfully deployed in the republic of Serbian Krajina. [end recording]

Western Slavonia Officials Protest 'Torture'

AU1202183492 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Report on news conference by Ilija Sasic, Western Slavonia information minister, and Vladimir Simbraga, director of the Western Slavonia Bureau in Belgrade, by Zorica Pantelic on 12 February in Belgrade—recorded]

[Text] The areas where fierce battles were fought and where 90 percent of the Serbian population have fled from will be subsequently put under the protection of the UN peacekeeping troops. These areas include Podravska Slatina, eastern Virovitica, south-western Donji Miholjac, and western Slavonska Pozega and Orahovica.

According to Ilija Sasic, the Croatian authorities in western Slavonia have continued their fierce torture of the remaining Serbians since signing the 15th cease-fire. Serbian property is being stolen, burned, and mined. Some 100 houses were burned in Podravska Slatina and similar things happened in approximately 50 other Western Slavonia villages.

The aim of the Croatian authorities is to frighten the Serbs and prevent their return to the region.

It was also stated at the news conference that there were even reports of Serbs being taken to unknown locations and murdered.

The Government of Western Slavonia appeals to international government and private organizations to raise their voices and condemn the behavior of the Croatian authorities, who, as has been said, are even mining the graves.

For the time being, Sasic emphasized, the Croatian forces are succeeding in frightening the Serbs, therefore maximum UN guarantees are needed for the refugee Serbs to return to their territory.

We selected the following from the numerous questions asked:

Are you in contact with the Western Slavonia refugees, and how do you reply to charges that you are an illegitimate leadership?

Sasic answered that they contact the refugees daily and that they receive information on the rest of the population from the government headquarters in Okucani.

According to Sasic, there are no reports of refugees returning. There are only sporadic cases of people returning. He was of the opinion that returning to Western Slavonia is not safe yet.

To a journalist's remark that some of the refugees claim their exile was unnecessary, Sasic answered that this is not true, as fierce battles were fought in this area. According to Sasic's information, 270 members of the Territorial Defense and a few more Yugoslav Peoples' Army soldiers died in the region prior to the exodus of the Serbian population.

Western Slavonia is part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Our actions are coordinated and we make decisions together, Sasic answered.

Asked to comment on Babic's [president of Krajina Government] demand that the Republic of Serbian Krajina be put under UN protection, Sasic said:

[Begin Sasic recording] After everything that happened during the last few days, and taking into consideration the decisions of the Krajina Assembly and everyone else, I believe that this is something that we really do not need at the moment. It would not lead to any final solution but merely delay the whole procedure. This could only make the situation in Serbian Krajina more serious. [end recording]

It was stated at the news conference that the government of Western Slavonia controls 48 percent of the territory.

Deputy Prime Minister on Territory Changes

92BA0457B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Dr. Milan Ramljak, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Croatia, by Aleksa Crnjakovic in Zagreb; date not given: "Tidying Up the Territory of the Republic of Croatia"]

[Text] Political, and particularly ethnic, passions have already prejudiced us so dangerously that we almost regularly attempt to find in almost any reasonable idea certain unreasonable intentions and hidden tricks. That has been the case with the proposal for "redrawing" the territory of Croatia. The project is still in the hands of the experts, but debates have already begun on the topic of "who is fooling whom." Dr. Milan Ramljak, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Croatia, for many years a professor of the science of administration in the School of Law at Zagreb University, is for that very reason a competent person to interview on the topic of the new territorial arrangement of Croatia, even though in the interview, it is noticeable, he was "torn" between his title and his profession, between what a lawyer can say and a politician dare not, because the reference is to a working paper.

[Crnjakovic] Why must the present territorial arrangement of the Republic of Croatia be changed?

[Ramljak] Because it dates from another time. When we adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, our point of departure was the observation that the present system of local self-government and the territorial system should be radically changed, because the earlier conception was derived from the so-called Marxist concept of the commune. This was an ideologized conception of organization of human communities. It conceives local units as the most suitable way of doing away with the state. It is difficult to simplify such a complicated problem, but I will tell you that most of the European countries have built local autonomy on the French model, in which it is more or less a part of government administration. In the former Yugoslavia, and therefore in Croatia as well, a communal system was established in which the opcina as a commune was supposed to be a negation of the state, a human community without political power. The 1974 Constitution left the opcina without any opportunity to effectively influence the central bodies of the state. For all practical purposes, legal instruments were not provided whereby the central bodies of government could influence the bodies of the opcinas, nor was there an appropriate mechanism for integration of the opcinas in the overall administrative and political system of the republic.

[Crnjakovic] But one still got the impression that it was a centralized system of authority.

[Ramljak] You are right. There were strong elements of centralization, but not by means of legal mechanisms, but through the powerful apparatus of the party. When

the party monopoly was abandoned and the party eliminated as an integrator of the administrative-political system, a great vacuum opened up.

[Crnjakovic] And whose role would that be? Some new party?

[Ramljak] Absolutely not! That role is reserved as a rule for the central government authority, above all for its executive branch. Here, we should distinguish the affairs of the government administration from the affairs of local autonomy and on the basis of that difference design units at both levels and their mutual relations with the central bodies of government authority. We foresaw something like that, but a clearly elaborated conception still did not exist when the new Constitution was drafted. We foresaw in the Constitution the opcina [municipality] and the kotar [district] as possible units of local autonomy, and the zupanija [parish] as units of local autonomy, but also as territorial units of government administration. The conception was that the units of local autonomy could handle the business of the government administration in addition to the business of local autonomy. Of course, the relations (and therefore also the business) of the agencies of those units with central state authorities, especially the government administration, are quite different.

[Crnjakovic] Now you are talking about the content. Does that mean that there will also be a change in the territorial framework in which the necessary content will be "injected"?

[Ramljak] Yes, that will also change.

[Crnjakovic] When?

[Ramljak] The sooner the better. But the new territorial division and reform of the entire local autonomy can be done only under stable political conditions.

[Crnjakovic] Why?

[Ramljak] Because this directly affects the interests of citizens. At the same time, this is an immense job. In the Western countries, this kind of reform following World War II took years, and teams of experts worked on that job. France attempted several times to carry out a reform of its territorial division, to enlarge the area of the opcinas, and it did not succeed in that. De Gaulle, you recall, "fell" over the attempt at regional reform.

[Crnjakovic] Has the text of the reform already been prepared?

[Ramljak] Within a small group of experts, there was a discussion last October of a text which was later polished, and the Bureau for Public Administration of the Ministry of Administration and Jurisprudence has already done a third version of the bill on local autonomy. Once again there were quite a few objections to it, and they are being incorporated into the new version. The opcina and the zupanija are both dealt with in this text. But it is clear even now that we cannot undertake a radical reform of the opcinas. We have decided to take the other route of minimal changes.

[Crnjakovic] What, then, will change?

[Ramljak] Contrary to our original intentions, for the present we will leave the opcinas in their present territorial framework. The opcina assembly will no longer be tricameral, but a unicameral body, as it is throughout the world.

[Crnjakovic] Will the draft of the law on local autonomy reach the deputies in the next session of the Assembly? That is, some are saying even now that good intentions are not involved, but motives based on the interest of the party, that the elections are the real reason for the hurry to change Croatia's regional system.

[Ramljak] It was our intention to prepare that draft even for the session in February, but it is not likely we will succeed. And there really is no basis for linking the regional reform to the upcoming elections, except in the case of organizing the new chamber in the zupanija assembly. That is, for deputies to be elected to that chamber, we need to organize the zupanijas, because the Constitution establishes them as the electoral units for the zupanija chamber. In principle, we could go through the elections without a law on local autonomy, an entire reform is not necessary, but it is desirable. Given the shortage of time, we think that it is enough to pass the law on the territory of the zupanijas. They would be established as units of local autonomy and units of the government administration. Emphasis would not be on the functions of the zupanija and its internal organization, but only on the question of their territory and number.

[Crnjakovic] Even before you submit the bill, but particularly afterward, you will be exposed to harsh criticism from all parts of Croatia, because the political connotation will simply be impossible to avoid. It certainly will be imputed to you that you are guided by ethnic rather than logical criteria in designing the territory of the zupanijas.

[Ramljak] There will probably be fire, but it will not be a barrage. Nevertheless, even the example of the zupanija makes it transparently evident how politically sensitive is the job of reforming local autonomy and administrative divisions. I do not think that people are looking for the "government's ulterior motives," but many think that it is possible through the zupanijas or other units of local autonomy to secure a monopoly position or at least greater influence in the system of government.

[Crnjakovic] How is the right proportion to be found between the interests of the state and the interests of the citizens of the zupanija?

[Ramljak] It is in the zupanijas that the attempt is being made to establish equilibrium between the general interest that is mediated through the state and the

particular local or regional interest. The subject matter of government administration imposes one conception for organization of the territory of the state. Protection of local interests imposes another, and they have to be reconciled.

[Crnjakovic] How?

[Ramljak] So far, we have had four different proposals concerning the number and territory of the zupanijas. According to the last proposal, Croatia would be divided into 17 zupanijas, and then Zagreb would have a special status.

[Crnjakovic] What criteria have been decisive in "shaping" the districts?

[Ramljak] Several criteria are combined. It would be wise to find a territorial framework which would guarantee at the very least a sufficient material base for financing public needs, that is, those services that will be performed within the zupanijas. There must also be certain elements of complementarity from the economic standpoint. This specifically means that the needs of the population and economic capabilities must to some extent complement one another. Attention must be paid to the transportation connections of the districts. The element of tradition also has exceptional weight when it comes to the identity of certain regions, such as Lika, Istria, Zagorje. When there have been strong traditional ties, those ties need to be retained.

[Crnjakovic] There will be a storm, in some places, Istria, for example, it has already started, concerning designation of the district seats. Here again, it is likely that all those elements will play a role.

[Ramljak] Of course. The zupanija seat must be that town toward which the entire district gravitates. But caution is also needed here. Take Zagreb, for example, toward which half of Croatia gravitates, but it still cannot be the seat of that half, especially if we desire more economic development for certain other parts. Take, for example, the relations between Pula and Pazin or Porec. There are gravitational flows toward Pula by the nature of things, even if it were not the seat, because of its developed economy. But if we wish to revitalize central Istria, we perhaps should think, I say perhaps, about creating new seats so that everything would not be concentrated in one place. That applies both to Istria and to other regions. Attention must also be paid to transportation connections of the zupanija area. What I mean to say is that we cannot exclusively apply just one criterion, but there must be a combination of those criteria.

[Crnjakovic] In these times, which are stormy because of the war and when political conditions are also particularly sensitive, ethnic criteria are added to all those criteria. Does this need to be taken into account, so that sometimes reference is taken from day-to-day political concerns? Are you not afraid that this will prevail in the creation of certain zupanijas and thus eliminate economic criteria? This could boomerang on the state, but also on those in the zupanija.

[Ramljak] We incorporated that criterion in the Law on Minorities, because in it we foresaw that certain functions that should be in the jurisdiction of the zupanijas are left to the opcinas which have special status.

[Crnjakovic] You mentioned that the kotars envisaged by the Constitution would not be formed for the present. Why?

[Ramljak] I told you that for now, because of a number of circumstances, we are undertaking minimal changes.

[Crnjakovic] Is it possible to reform the system of administrative divisions without at the same time returning to their native regions those who have been driven out or who have fled?

[Ramljak] It is possible, but there is no point. Now, we expect that when the Serbian army withdraws from the occupied regions, when the illegal military formations are disarmed, and when the blue helmets come, conditions will be brought about for the return of those who fled or were driven out.

[Crnjakovic] But you and I know that the occupying Army perceives the Sarajevo agreement differently, that is, that it does not wish to leave areas where the blue helmets do not go.

[Ramljak] Well, they did not want to leave any place nor a single garrison in Croatia, but, nevertheless, they have done so. The moment is not far off when they will also leave the Croatian territories they have temporarily occupied.

[Crnjakovic] I respect your optimism, even though just now on the eve of this interview of ours there nevertheless has been another fierce attack on Osijek. Will Croatia wait until the occupier collapses, will it seek external intervention, or will it attack on its own?

[Ramljak] True, the occupier is not respecting the truce, as is proven by the datum that more than 40 members of the Croatian army and civilians have been killed in the short period of time since Sarajevo, and many have been wounded. The occupier is violating the truce in two ways. On the one hand, it is continuing military operations. On the other, it is committing atrocities in the occupied areas, it is terrorizing, persecuting, and resettling the Croatian population in order to move Serbs into their houses. The enemy is obviously not renouncing his war objective—changing the demographic pattern in the occupied area so that the change in the composition of the population will make it easier later on to annex that region to an expanded Serbia. The Serbian side turns a deaf ear to all appeals of the international community, and we will not be able to look on peacefully.

[Crnjakovic] How long will the patience last?

[Ramljak] Representatives of the EC and United Nations will have to devote the most serious concern to this problem, because they must be aware that we cannot, we dare not, and we do not want to put up with terror. We must provide physical protection to the Croatian population.

[Crnjakovic] But you are aware of how slow the international community is. Will we last that long?

[Ramljak] If the blue helmets do not come soon, and if the persecution of the Croatian population escalates in the occupied areas, we will have to respond militarily.

[Crnjakovic] Do we have the strength, and where is the limit in practical and operational terms when you say "escalation"?

[Ramljak] I think that we already have sufficient force, but we want to avoid further human casualties and destruction of property. Where is the limit? I cannot tell you that now, because I think that there are very good prospects, unless the truce is violated more radically, for the blue helmets to come soon.

[Crnjakovic] You recently mentioned that the Serbian side ought to proclaim capitulation. How, when it did not even declare war?

[Ramljak] There have been a number of international conflicts without declaration of war that were followed by proclamation of capitulation. Whoever lost the war capitulated regardless of whether he had declared war or not. Here it is not a question of the victor seeking surrender of the defeated, but I think that Serbia with this war has not succeeded, which is quite obvious, in achieving its political objective: territorial expansion at the expense of Croatian territory.

[Crnjakovic] But Baranja? Has it not been conquered?

[Ramljak] Yes, but temporarily. The international community has taken the view that there is to be no forcible change of borders, and that is a sufficient guarantee that Serbia cannot realize its expansionist intentions. But the European Community, the states which have recognized, and the Security Council would have to take steps to prevent Serbia from causing further casualties in its desire to achieve unrealistic political objectives. By recognizing Croatia, they have shown that they will do that and will come to the aid of political forces in Serbia whose resistance to the war is getting stronger and stronger.

[Crnjakovic] You also mention the necessity of "dismantling" the Army. Who can do that, and how?

[Ramljak] I am not thinking of "dismantling," because it could be "assembled" once again. The Army should be altogether eliminated and dissolved. It should disappear just like Yugoslavia has disappeared.

[Crnjakovic] But Serbia wants to retain Yugoslavia.

[Ramljak] It does, but it cannot do so. Yugoslavia is dead; it died from the infection of Serbian hegemony. What is left of the Army has been put at the service of Serbia, and it should be treated as such legally, politically, and militarily. It is simply Serbian; it can no longer make reference to Yugoslavia. And the international community must not allow a small Balkan country with expansionist intentions to have such a military force in its hands. It must be limited. The final division must begin as soon as possible, and that would include the Army, both its personnel and its equipment. Let the Croatian personnel come back if they want to their homeland. Let the weapons be divided on the principle of the share of each former republic in the national income, that is, on the basis of the calculation of the former Yugoslavia. And the one who caused the war and "came up short" must feel the moral contempt, political condemnation, military disaster, and material sanctions.

Montenegro

Party Leader Lays Claim to Croatian Territory

LD1202235192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1718 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Herceg-Novi, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—At today's pre-referendum meeting in Herceg-Novi, the secretary general of the Montenegrin ruling party, Svetozar Marovic, dwelt on the question of the border between Montenegro and Croatia in the region of Prevlaka [peninsula on the northern side of the mouth of Boka Kotorska].

Marovic said "Prevlaka is ours. I do not mean in juridical terms. It is a condition for the independence of Montenegro and of the state which will exist in this region. Prevlaka is the key to the entrance to Montenegro from the sea. The Montenegrin government holds the keys to this door. In order to keep hold of this key, intensive international diplomatic activity is essential in the next few days, both with subjects abroad and in our immediate vicinity."

This key, Marovic considers, can be held on to by peaceful means, by agreement and sensibly. "If this is not achieved, I would not like to say what might happen. The Montenegrin government would, in such a situation, have to propose to its people the necessary measures and take the necessary actions to protect the interests of Montenegro, its territorial, political, and state future.

Svetozar Marovic also said, in connection with the Montenegrin referendum on the creation, "with those who want it," of a future "common state" which is the subject of the referendum question, that it is not a question of unification. It is a question of whether Montenegro, with others, will attempt to preserve its country.

Macedonia

JNA Withdrawal Possible by End of Feb

LD1202161192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1503 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 12 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) will most probably pull out of Yugoslavia's southernmost republic of Macedonia by the end of the month, the Belgrade daily BORBA reports today.

The daily quotes unofficial reports that commander of the Third Army District, based in Skopje, Lieutenant-General Milan Uzelac and the Macedonian police have reached agreement that the JNA withdraw from this republic, which asked the European Community (E.C.) in mid-January to recognize its sovereignty.

BORBA reports that the withdrawal of the Army could be completed even before February 15—two days before the E.C. again considers the question of the recognition of Macedonia.

The daily claims that the Army has already removed its equipment from Skopje's Petrovac Airport and that a convoy of 500 Army vehicles have moved rocket launchers, cannon, tanks, armored transporters and other military equipment.

BORBA also points out that it is the general belief in Macedonia that most of the JNA barracks in this republic have already been vacated.

The Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI underscores that the Macedonian leadership, in an attempt to become independent of Yugoslavia as soon as possible and "evidently guided by certain Western countries," has rashly and without any justified reason aggravated relations with JNA units in that republic.

This Belgrade daily says that Skopje is trying to provoke conflicts in order to accuse the JNA of aggression and thus compromise it before the international public.

The daily points out that the "Achilles heel of independent Macedonia" is its western part, where around 30,000 ethnic Albanians are armed and ready to rebel in order to form a second state of Albania.

The daily concludes that the Macedonian leadership seems to be ignoring the serious territorial aspirations of Bulgaria, Albania and Greece, failing to realize that Yugoslavia was the first and the last to guarantee identity and statehood to the Macedonian nation.

Slovenia

Peterle Requests EC Associate Membership

AU1202202592 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Lojze Peterle, president of the Slovene Government, sent a letter to the 12 prime ministers of the EC countries today. Among other things, he stated that following EC recognition, Slovenia wishes to be integrated into the international community as an equal partner as soon as possible.

By accepting the principles of the observation of human rights, parliamentary democracy, and market economy, Slovenia has created the basic conditions for the development of versatile cooperation with the European and other states.

The president also said that Slovenia attaches particular importance to economic cooperation. The primary and most vital interest of the Republic of Slovenia, as a central European state, is to establish direct cooperation with the EC in the coming period.

This stand was taken by the Slovene Assembly when defining the international position of Slovenia. The Assembly has set the associate membership in the EC as Slovenia's first international objective in the coming period. Bearing in mind this decision, Slovenia wishes to start negotiations on the agreement of association with the EC as soon as possible.

For the period prior to the signing of such an agreement, President Peterle proposed that, on the condition that this is mutually acceptable, the current regulations continue to be implemented in practical life.

This would help overcome the problems that the Slovene economy is facing currently, and would facilitate Slovenia's unhindered transition on the market economy.

Kucan To Run for President in Next Elections

AU1202204992 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 10 Feb 92 p 2

[Slovene Press Agency report: "Milan Kucan Confirmed His Presidential Candidacy"]

[Excerpt] Ljubljana, 9 February—Milan Kucan, president of the Slovene Presidency, in his interview for NASA SLOVENIA magazine openly announced his decision to run for the president of the Republic of Slovenia in the next elections. [passage omitted]